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INTRODUCTION 
The small, mountainous nation of Costa Rica enjoys a reputation as 
a uniquely peaceful democracy which stands apart from its neighbors in 
violent Central America. Modern Costa Rica enjoys a high standard of 
living, and its extensive social welfare system has created a tranquil 
and patriotic citizenry which proudly participates in the political 
process. Visitors to Costa Rica never cease to be amazed by the extent 
of popular participation in Latin America's showcase democracy. 
The reasons for contemporary Costa Rica's unique status derive from 
a combination of geographical, historical and political factors. The 
first Spanish conquistadors to explore the uncharted region were 
confronted with dense jungles and steep mountains which hindered 
colonization. The location of Costa Rica, at the southernmost portion 
of a province with colonial headquarters in Guatemala, resulted in 
lengthy delays in transportation and communication. Several weeks of 
hard travel to reach the nearest point of civilization discouraged the 
rapid development of Costa Rica, as settlers first colonized the areas 
closest to the Capitancy-General in Guatemala. 
The lack of a large indigenous population forced the Spaniards in 
Costa Rica to work individually at their agricultural pursuits, and 
deprived them of the serf class which existed in the other colonies. 
Without slave labor, farming was limited to small family farms rathc:r 
than the large feudal estates that developed in Costa Rica's neighbors. 
2 
The small farms produced neither large incomes nor royalties for the 
Crown, which led to a relationship with Mother Spain best characterized 
as benign neglect. Isolated Costa Rica received little aid or attention 
from colonial authorities, and the colony was forced to dev lop 
independently. 
As the nation of small independent farmers entered the era of 
colonial independence, it was only natural for Costa Ricans to favor 
separation from Spain, whose long distance rule had played little part 
in national development. In the nation's first domestic political 
crisis, as in another which occurred 120 years later, a hero emerged to 
guide the nation on a democratic course. Later leaders vacillated 
between representative government and authoritarianism as the nation 
~rifted aimlessly. Personalist politics dominated Costa Rican history, 
as a succession of politicians and caudillos•came and went. Regardless 
of the leader of the moment, however, an independent and democratic 
spirit remained at the heart of national political developments. 
Several presidents contributed greatly to Costa Rican democracy, and the 
tradition of nonviolent political succession became ingrained in the 
national consciousness. 
During the 1940's Costa Rica underwent the most dramatic social 
change in its history, with the establishment of President Rafael Angel 
Calderon Guardia's extensive social welfare program. The president, in 
concert with the Costa Rican Communist Party and the Church, dominated 
the domestic political scene for eight years. When Calderon Guardia 
attempted to return to power through fraudulent means, opponents of the 
government precipitated the 1948 Civil War. 
3 
The complex blend of domestic and international politics which led 
to the Civil War was further complicated by the involvement of the 
United States in the conflict. The United States acted decisively when 
faced with the prospect of a Costa Rican government which included 
communist participation, as it began to exhibit the first symptoms of 
Cold War anti-communist paranoia. Washington assisted in the victory of 
the rebels in the Civil War due to concern about Connnunism in Costa 
Rica. 
The American intervention in Costa Rica produced a more important 
result than merely the defeat of Calderon Guardia and his communist 
allies. By installing Jos: Figueres' forces in power the United States 
obtained quite a bargain, since this intellectual visionary was 
determined to institutionalize democracy in Costa Rica. As head of a 
ruling Junta, Figueres abolished Costa Rica's army, promulgated a new 
reformist Constitution and oversaw the installation of a democratic 
government eighteen months after his Civil War victory. Figueres 
travelled widely while out of office and acquired an international 
reputation as a progressive democrat. He offered liberals throughout 
the hemisphere an alternative to authoritarian dictators in the fig t 
against Communism, and he criticized the United States for its Cold War 
foreign policy in Latin America. 
Figueres returned to Costa Rica to serve two terms as the 
presidential candidate of the new Partido Liberaci~n Nacional, the first 
western-style political party in Costa Rica. The establishment of 
Partido Liberacion Nacional as an organization devoted to a particular 
philosophy, Social Democracy, distinguished it from its predecessors in 
4 
Costa Rica, which tended to revolve around the personality of a 
particular individual rather than ideas or issues. The elimination of 
personalism from national politics marked the institutionalization of 
democracy in Costa Rica. 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the development of modern 
Costa Rica's unique status as an exemplary democracy in a region where 
democratic traditions are not known to flourish. The effect of the 
American diplomatic intervention which determined the outcome of the 
1948 Civil War, and which led to the restoration and institutional-
ization of democracy in this small Central American nation, will also be 
examined. 
CHAPTER I 
COSTA RICA: A DIFFERENT COLONY 
The Spaniards who came to colonize Costa Rica in the early 
sixteenth century were confronted from the outset by the nation's 
unforgiving topography. The physical characteristics of the country 
include two high mountain ranges, the Cordillera de Tilara'n and the 
Cordillera de Talamanca, which run north and south and divide Costa Rica. 
The mountains are principally volcanic in origin and range as high as 
thirteen thousand feet. Volcanic eruptions occur periodically and have 
plagued the nation throughout recorded history. The volcanic slopes are 
covered with dense jungle which also has proven to be an implacable foe 
of development. The width of Costa Rica ranges from a narrow 75 miles 
in the south along her border with Panama to 175 miles in the north and 
the Nicaraguan border. The length of the country is 300 miles and at 
19,653 square miles Costa Rica is the second smallest nation in Central 
America (El Salvador is the smallest, with 8,260 square miles). Th 
eastern boundary is the Caribbean Sea and the western boundary is the 
Pacific Ocean, with countless rivers on both coasts flowing down out of 
the rugged interior. By the end of the seventeenth century, population 
growth was largely confined to a large plateau of approximately three 
hundred square miles in size, located in the central portion of the 
nation. The plateau, or Meseta Central, 
5 
6 
ranges in altitude from 2500 to 4000 feet, with a temperate climate 
11 . d E 1 . . l we -suite to uropean co onization. 
The initial settlement of the nation took place upon coastal 
beaches and easily-accessible river mouths, which afforded shelter from 
the sea without the rigors and dangers of a journey into the forbidding 
interior. As the colonists set their sights upon the task of exploring 
Costa Rica, the problems before them must have appeared insurmountabl • 
Looking towards the distant cordilleras, the Spaniards saw only 
countless forested ridges, each higher than the previous, rising steeply 
out of the sea as they marched off to the horizon. As the most 
physically inaccessible nation of New Spain, Costa Rica demanded a 
special fortitude and determination from those who challenged 
2 her. 
The first European to come into contact with Costa Rica was the 
I ~ Cristobal Colon. On his second voyage to the renowned explorer, ew 
World in 1502, he proceeded south along the Caribbean coast of Central 
America in search of a passage to the Ganges river. A tropical storm 
/ 
suddenly arose and forced Colon to seek shelter behind islands in the 
Rio San Juan, the modern boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The 
expedition later spent a few day in Cariay, a small village further 
south a long the coast. 
, 
Colon's reports of natives of Costa Rica were 
well received in Spain and stimulated further interest in the 
exploration of the region, primarily to search for gold and convert 
f 1 . Ch . . . 3 peace u natives to ristianity. 
The closest Spanish outpost to the new territory was ~ Leon, 
7 
in 
Nicaragua, and its governor dispatched an expedition to undertake the 
first extensive exploration of Costa Rica. Captain Gil Gonzalez Davila 
began his journey in Panama and sailed northward along the Pacific coast 
of Costa Rica. Not long into the voyage, Gonzci'lez Davila "was forced to 
beach three of his vessels to save them from the worms, while the fourth 
returned to Panama for pitch and other articles of repair . ,.4 
Torrential rains and flooding on the beach forced Gonzalez Davila to 
break camp and leave behind a small group to guard the ships while the 
main party of one hundred men made its way inland. 
After a journey of several hundred miles, the explorers arrived at 
their planned destination, the village of the cacique Ni coy a. 
Provisions were obtained and treaties of peace and friendship were 
concluded, as Gonzalez Davila set about converting the various local 
tribes to Christianity. The Spaniards encountered little hostility and 
were well-received by the Indians, which made the mission a great 
success. As American historian Hubert H. Bancroft writes: Gonzalez 
Davila distinguished himself " • because the sword remained sheathed, 
and it was found profitable as well as humane to keep it so • ,.5 
Costa Rican historian Ricardo Fernandez Guardia also speaks well of the 
first Spaniard to explore Costa Rica, writing: 
Gil Gonzalez Dc(vila merece lugar prominente en la galer1a de 
los grandes aventureros espanoles. La construcion de sus nav!os, 
su marcha de 224 leguas con un pufiado de hombres por entre 
numerosas tribus guerreras, su lucha contra los obst.fculos de la 
Naturaleza, mas parecen fabulas que obras humanas. Sin embargo, SU 
nombre no brilla en las historias como lo merece, tal vez por no 
8 
estar asociado a esos grandes cr{menes que han dado al de otros 
tanta fama. Gran cazador de oro, pero humano, tal vez por no estar 
asociado supo llegar a sus fines sin cometer exacciones ni 
crueldades. 
Gonzalez Davila's humane treatment of Costa Rica's natives and the good 
will they showed him encouraged further contacts between Europeans and 
the Indians. It came to pass that those explorers who accomplished the 
I' 
most in sixteenth century Costa Rica followed the example of Gonzalez 
Da'vila and dealt humanely with the native Indians. Logically, an 
approach to Spanish colonization of Costa Rica which employed the least 
hostile methods would obviously win more native converts than the 
tactics of men such as Pizarro, who favored the mass destruction of the 
native culture. Convinced of the sincerity of the colonists, Costa 
Rica's Indians integrated more rapidly into the European culture. 
An example of the benevolent variety of conquistador was Costa 
Rica's first provincial governor, / Juan Vasquez de Coronado, who is 
generally credited with the actual settlement and exploration of the 
region. In December 1562, the governor of Leon appointed Coronado 
alcalde mayor of Nicaragua and urged him to immediately begin a voyage 
to Costa Rica. The appointment was welcomed by Coronado, who was 
determined to make a name for himself in New Spain. As Costa Rican 
historian Victoria Urbano writes, for Coronado "Anu{rica fue la meta, la 
ambiciO'n, el sueiio, el poderfo, la reencarnacidn misma de la gloria. 
Ame"rica fue sinbnimo de oro y fortuna, de tierra propia, de horizonte 
abierto." 7 
Coronado began his explorations 6 September 1562 and used as a 
starting point the village of the cacique Nicoya. The natives responded 
quite favorably to Coronado's honest and moral approach to colonization 
9 
and conquest, and the Spaniard succeeded in making many conversions 
while mapping the vast territory. At each contact with natives, 
Coronado stressed the peaceful nature of his mission and treated the 
tribesmen with respect and dignity. As Fern£ndez Guardia writes: 
• • • porque debe decirse en honor suyo que no hay quizls en 
toda la historia de la conquista de Ame"rica memoria de un 
capit!n mas humanitario y menos codicioso. Entre numerosos 
hechos puede citarse el de haber mandado enterrar la Unica 
cad7na quS llevaban sus soldados para prisicfn de los 
caciques. 
Costa Rican historian Victoria Urbano concurs with Fernandez Guardia, 
and writes: "La obra realizada por V~quez de Coronado es digna en todo 
encomio, no solo por la audacia y energia desplegadas por este Caudillo, 
, ,, 
que pudo veneer obstaculos que aun hoy, con mayores facilidades, parecen 
insuperables, sino por la manera supo llevarla a cabo."9 
Coronado founded or reestablished settlements at Quepo(s) on the Pacific 
coast, near the site of present-day Cart ago in the interior, and at 
· · t th h t Costa Rica. lO various po in s roug ou When Coronado's expedition 
found sizeable gold deposits in the Valle de Talamanca, the Spaniards 
11 justified the optimistic name given the nation years before. As a 
devout Christian and a responsible conquistador, Coronado left his mark 
on the fledgling nation and is considered the founder of modern Costa 
Rica. As Urbano points out, ''Vale la pena que notemos la sinceridad con 
que V~quez de Coronado confio' en la ayuda divina, manifestando de una 
forma espontc(nea SU mas honda convicciO'n cristiana y la bondad de SU 
d el . d. "12 con ucta para con in io. 
10 
Several of the successors of Coronado played roles in Costa Rica's 
development but the principal noteworthy individual was Governor Rodrigo 
Arias Maldonado, who was appointed in 1660. 13 Maldonado became the 
first Spaniard to establish settlements in the Talamanca region and 
succeeded in the conversion of large numbers of primitive Indians. 
Colonial outposts were founded at a variety of previously hostile native 
and many Indians adopted Spanish socia 1 customs and villages, 
14 
manners. When Governor Maldonado retired, colonial relations with 
the Indians received a major setback. For the rest of the sevent enth 
and most of the eighteenth centuries, the Talamanca region remained 
beyond Spanish jurisdiction, host to a variety of hostile tribes. 15 
Internal warfare, and the ravages of nature and foreign disease served 
to depopulate and neutralize the Indians and accelerate their 
integration into Spanish colonial society. By 1800, most of Costa 
16 Rica's Indians were considered citizens rather than indios. 
After a few generations, the distinction between the native Costa 
Ricans and Spanish immigrants virtually disappeared, as the natives 
abandoned their former traditions and began to emulate those of the 
colonists. The nation developed into a classless society of small and 
poor farmers, as Indians, colonists and Spanish officials alike were 
forced to work their own plots of land. The lack of a large, 
impoverished native underclass deprived the colonists of Costa Rica of 
a reservoir of serfs upon which to base their agricultural growth. 
Unlike Costa Rica, other nations of colonial Latin America developed 
vast plantation economies which utilized Indian laborers under 
11 
conditions which approximated slavery. Forced to depend entirely upon 
their own backbreaking labor to extract a living from the soil, Costa 
Rican farmers limited the size of their farms. As the Biesanz write in 
their outstanding study of a nation and its culture, The Costa Ricans: 
Indians in many Spanish colonies were obligated to work 
as serfs for the colonists a certain number of days a year, or 
pay taxes. The colonists in turn offered to protect and 
Christianize them. The system did not work well in Costa 
Rica, where so many Indians fled into the forests that by the 
middle of the seventeenth century the colonists, sometimes 
including the governor himself, had to work the soil with 
their own hands. With the failure of the 1;eudal system, a pattern of family farms became the norm. 
Without a slave class, Costa Rica developed more slowly than her 
Central American sister provinces. Guatemala was the colonial 
headquarters for the entire region north of Panama and held principal 
importance for the Crown. The large estates which arose in Guatemala, 
using native Indian labor, paid substantial amounts to taxes to Spain, 
while the small and poor farms of Costa Rica were ignored. A weak tax 
base and geographic isolation explains the two hundred years of neglect 
which characterized Costa Rica's relationship with Spain. Left to their 
own devices, European settlers adapted as best they could to an alien 
environment with myriad obstacles. While their counterparts in 
Guatemala lived under the constant and obtrusive supervision of Spanish 
colonial authorities, the colonists in Costa Rica survived (but hardly 
flourished) independently, without the help or hindrance of the Spanish. 
12 
The principal cities of colonial Costa Rica were Cartago, founded 
by Coronado 12 June 1563 and Heredia, founded in the early eighteenth 
century. Both cities tended to be politically conservative and had 
populations which considered themselves to be the "aristocracy" of Costa 
Rica, despite lack of claims to royal titles. By dint of their 
prominence in Costa Rica's colonial development, these cities felt 
obligated to perpetuate the mythical "noble line" of a few of the 
wealthier families to give Costa Rica the aristocracy any "modern" 
nation required. The contrast between the elite image held by Cartago 
and Heredia, and the foundation of the cities of San Jose and Alajuela 
is dramatic. 
The latter cities proudly trace their historic roots to the rise of 
smuggling and the creation of contrabandistas in Costa Rica. The route 
from Guatemala City to Cartago, the principal avenue of trade, passed 
through the village of Esparza (Esparta) and crossed the Rib Grande near 
La Garita before climbing the continental divide near Ochomogo and 
descending into Cartago. A customs house was established at Ochomogo, 
about six miles west of Cartago, and to avoid paying taxes on 
merchandise from the north, a village of smugglers was founded just west 
of the customs post. The village, which grew rapidly as a liberal and 
lawless enclave, was the town of San JosFf. 
Alajuela's development paralleled that of San Jose~ and began once 
San Jose' had grown into a successful city which no longer sought to 
avoid the payment of duties. With the support of San 
, 
Jose, 
authorities sponsored the construction of a new customs house on the 
the 
13 
western end of the Meseta Central, on the eastern bank of the Rfo 
Grande. The intent was to eliminate the lucrative business of 
smuggling, now that people of San Jos~ considered themselve s citizens of 
Costa Rica and not outlaws any longer. To avoid the new customs house, 
another small village developed along a route which bypassed the tax 
collectors, just as San Jos~ had formed two decades earlier. The new 
village, located on the Rio' Segundo, grew to become the town of 
Alajuela. The citizens of Alajuela were predominantly contrabandistas, 
tended to be political liberals, and developed into middle class 
merchants whose livelihood was derived from the purchase and sale of 
i l lega 1 merchandise. The development of San Jose" and Alajuela as 
liberal, middle class mercantile centers proved to be a constant source 
of friction between these cities and the conservative, agrarian centers 
18 
of Heredia and Cartage, with their pseudo-aristocrats. 
The nineteenth century was a productive and critical period in the 
development of Costa Rica's democracy. The placid and remote life of 
Costa Rica's citizens underwent the most dramatic changes since the 
"' landing of Colon in Cariay in 1502, as events in Europe ushered in the 
industrial age. Although the liberal philosophical movements of the Old 
World arrived nearly one quarter century later in the New World, all of 
Latin America, including isolated Costa Rica, became embroiled in the 
fervor of revolutionary spirit. 
The clarion call for Liberty, Equality and Fraternity raised by t e 
French Revolution and the principles of liberal democracy embodied 
within the American Declaration of Independence inspired a plethora of 
14 
Latin American nationalists. Revolutionary consciousness in Latin 
America arose out of the 1794 publication of a Spanish translation of 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man by Antonio Narino in Bogota, 
Colombia. A large new group of receptive listeners were thus exposed to 
19 the new philosophies of distant Europe. 
In remote and isolated Costa Rica, the passion for independence and 
revolution did produce important political changes, but was not nearly 
as important for the lives of its citizens as in the other nations in 
Latin America. Unlike the other nations of the Spanish empire, the 
citizens of Costa Rica were accustomed to a greater degree of freedom 
and self determination simply due to imperial neglect. As previously 
mentioned, the small landowners of Spain's most forgotten colony were 
forced to make the best of things without supervision, interference or 
assistance from Mother Spain. The individuals responsible for colonial 
development tended to take matters into their own hands, thus 
establishing the precedent of self reliance and independence at an early 
stage of growth. When the nations of Central America received their 
long sought-after independence from Spain, the lives of the citizens of 
each nation underwent a dramatic change - except in Costa Rica. Little 
20 
changed for the small nation of farmers. Although neglected Costa 
Rica had for some time established a system of town meetings to discuss 
important community problems, the resignation of the Spanish governor in 
1821 resulted in the first 
15 
national rather than local assemblage. The representatives of the 
individual town Juntas met to create the Junta Superior Gubernativa 
Interina, also referred to as the first Junta de Legados. Upon learning 
of Guatemalan and Nicaraguan declarations of independence from Spain, 
the delegates of the Junta de Legados followed suit, and proclaimed 
Costa Rica's independence from Spain 12 November 1821. The Junta de 
Legados met continuously throughout November, and by December had 
21 
created the first constitution of newly-independent Costa Rica. 
Costa Rica's first constitution was called El Pacto Social 
Fundamental de Costa Rica, or the Pacto de Concordia. The latter title 
suggests that multiple questions addressed by the document, which dealt 
with independence from Spain, the direction of the nation's political 
future and the perennial problem of the site of Costa Rica's capital, 
previously 22 Cart ago. The positions and sympathies of diverse 
factions were taken into consideration in drawing up the new 
constitution but significantly divergent viewpoints remained. The more 
liberal cities, Alajuela and San 
independence and the establishment 
, 
Jose, 
of an 
favored unconditional 
independent repub lie. 
Conservative, agrarian-oriented Cartago and Heredia preferred the more 
cautious approach of independence from Spain and an alliance with 
Iturbide' s empire, Gaf"nza' s federation or regional movements in Santa 
Marta or Lecfn. Although the major goal of the Pacto de Concordia was to 
heal factional differences and enter into a mutually acceptable 
compromise, continued intransigence by conservative Cart ago prevented 
f . . . 1 23 reconciliation and foreshadowed two decades o intercity riva ry. 
16 
It is apparent the principal point of contention was not the 
philosophical schism between annexation and separatism, as might be 
expected, but rather simple jealousy. The article of the Pacto de 
Concordia which dealt with the site of the nation's capital called for 
periodic rotation among the four principal towns rather than maintaining 
the center of government in Cartage. The representatives and the chief 
executive would sleep in a variety of homes in different towns rather 
than having one presidental residence in Cartage. The conservative 
nobleza of Costa Rica's oldest town, the historic, social and political 
capital of the country, were unable to contain their hatred for the 
other towns. In particular, the rapidly growing liberal stronghold of 
San Jose'was viewed as the thief of Cartage's proud heritage. 24 
Political tensions increased during 1821, and when the Junta met 13 
January 1822 an air of uncertainty prevailed. Daily sessions were 
marred by acrimonious name calling while the pressing question of Costa 
Rica's political future went 25 unattended. Fraternal bitterness was 
abruptly forgotten when a powerful earthquake struck in the dawn of 7 
May 1822. The earthquake of San Estanislao inflicted tremendous 
destruction upon all of Central America; Cartage was the hardest hit in 
Costa Rica. Nature accomplished that which political debate could not, 
as the earthquake brought former enemies together in a massive 
reconstruction effort which involved citizens throughout the nation. 
As Fern6ndez Guardia writes: "No hay mal que por bien no venga, ••. Y 
as! sucedib con el terremoto de San Estanislao. Consternados 
cartagineses y josefinos, imperialistas y republicanos, resolvieron 
17 
26 poner punto final a sus disputas y querellas." On the 8th and 9th 
of May the councils of Cartago and San Jose' agreed not to discuss the 
issue of the nation's political direction until after repair efforts 
were completed, and the remainder of 1822 was spent in peace as Costa 
Rica rebuilt. 
The respite from politics endured until the meeting of the second 
Junta in Cartago 1 January 1823. Once again, hostile debate surrounded 
the refusal of the imperialists of Cartago and Heredia to compromise 
with the Republicans. During the spring of 1823 the rhetoric was 
replaced by intimidation and threats, as the imperialists increased the 
level of tension. Their courage was bolstered by correspondence with 
imperialist politicians in El Salvador, who assured the Costa Ricans a 
large relief expedition was coming to aid them and force the submission 
of San Jose' and Alajuela. 27 
As tensions reached a breaking point, war became inevitable. When 
arms from the garrison in Cartago were stolen, apparently intended for 
use against San Jose': the first Civil War in Costa Rica began. Alajuela 
and San Jos~ united and their combined forces engaged in several 
indecisive battles against the imperialists. The tide turned on 5 
April 1823 due to the resourceful strategy of the military commander of 
the government forces, General Gregorio Jose Ram!rez. Following a 
bloody victory at Ochomogo which involved over two thousand combatants, 
Ram{rez chased the defeated opposition down the mountain into Cartage 
d f d h . . ' b . . 28 an orce t e cities su mission. 
Gregorio Josi Ram{rez of Alaj ue la must be considered the most 
important figure in nineteenth century Costa Rican history. The 
18 
military victory at Ochomogo was important, but the role played by 
Ram{rez in the period immediately following the capitulation of the 
imperialists dramatically determined the future of his newly indep ndent 
nation. In the same vein as Gonzilez D{vila and Vlsquez de Coronado, 
Ram1'rez is truly one of the "founding fathers" of Costa Rican democracy. 
Following the 29 March 1823 defeat of Cartago and Heredia, the 
disoriented nation found itself without a government or any idea of its 
political future. Confused Costa Ricans turned to Ramirez for 
leadership and the unwilling general temporarily became the nation's 
first dictator. "Para salvarla de la anarqufa y restablecer el orden 
legal, don Gregorio Jose/Ramfrez tuvo que asumir la dictadura; pero tan 
so'lo la ejercib durante el tiempo estrictamente necesario para llevar a 
b ~ . 1 . ~ . . . / h b~ . ..29 uen termino a patr1ot1ca mision que se a ia impuesto. 
For ten short days Ramfrez grudgingly assumed supreme command over 
the destiny of Costa Rica while searching for a solution to domestic 
strife. Despite widespread popular support for a permanent dictatorship 
similar to that of other nations of the region, Ramfrez made it clear 
from the outset the temporary diversion from democratic rule would 
endure only until an alternative could be chosen. During the time 
Ram(rez was in charge, arrangements were made for a reunion of anot er 
Junta de Legados to meet in San Jose"' IO May 1823, and when the delegates 
assembled Ram{rez announced his return to Alajuela. Republican 
politicians urged Ram{rez to remain in power, as did a number of 
citizens, but Ram{rez was adamant in demanding a return to democratic 
government and preferred retirement over a public career. 
19 
/ 
As Fernandez Guardia writes: 
Ram{rez era realmente un dembcrata de coraz6n y un buen 
ciudadano, coma lo prueba la circunstancia de no haber querido 
quedarse con la dictadura despuls de la jornada de Ochomogo y de la 
rendici6n de las imperialistas. Al contrari6 se apresuro a 
restablecer el orden legal, convocando a la Asamblea a fin de que 
cfsta reorganizase el Gobierno de la provincia, coma en efecto lo 
hizo ••• Gregorio Josef Ram{rez es acreedor al respeto y la 
gratitud de sus conciudadanos, par sus virtudes cfvicas, su 
acendrado amor a la patria, al pueblo y a la libertad, as{ coma §Br 
el eminente servicio que les prestc en una hara de gran peligro. 
Age and the rigors of battle took their toll on the hero of Costa Rica's 
first Civil War. During the summer of 1823 a grateful Asamblea awarded 
the infirm general a lifetime pension and the title of Benemerito Hija 
de la Patria. Upon notice of Ramirez' death in November 1823 a national 
day of mourning was accompanied by the widespread show of grief and 
sympathy of most of Costa Rica's citizens. When the ceremonies in 
Cartage, the imperialist stronghold, began to take on a festive air, 
troops were called out and several protesters were arrested, but, in 
general, the people of Costa Rica felt a sense of profound 31 loss. 
The ten day dictatorship of Ramirez served as a bridge between the Pacto 
de Concordia and the election of Costa Rica's first president in 1824 
and undeniably forced Costa Rica to stay on the road to democracy rat r 
than accept anarchy or authoritarianism. 
The dictatorship of Gregorio Jose Ramirez provided an invaluable 
service to the nation's fledgling democracy; the debt owed by Costa Rica 
to Ramirez is priceless. The three short years of Independence from 
Spain marked the decline in power of Cartage and Heredia, and the 
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ascendancy of San Jose'to national preeminence. The role of Ram{rez was 
to usher in an age of relative tranquility, during which the nation 
could develop and prosper. Just as Ram!rez forced Costa Rica to remain 
on a democratic course, another national hero would come along 120 years 
later and again save the nation from tyranny. 
Figueres. 
That man was / Jose 
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CHAPTER II 
A NATION IN SEARCH OF DIRECTION 
The actions of Gregorio Jos/ Ram{rez ensured a continuation of 
representative government, and culminated in a national reunion of 
citizens to select a president. When the group assembled on 6 September 
1824 they selected as the first Costa Rican chief executive ". • el 
·/ ilustre, modesto y virtuoso ciudadano don Juan Mora Fernandez, natural 
I / < de San Jose, uno de los hombres que mas se habian distinguido por su 
patriotismo en las mementos dif{ciles de la emancipaci6n." 1 The 
nation was once again blessed with a man of exceptional leadership 
capabilities. During two highly successful terms of office Mora 
distinguished himself with undiminished drive and a clear vision of the 
nation's future which finally allowed the region's forgotten stepchild, 
Costa Rica, to progress and prosper, surpassing such neighbors as 
Honduras and Nicaragua in capital growth and social development. 
One of the first acts of Mora's tenure was to accept the petition 
of the citizens of Nicoya and annex Guanacaste as Costa Rican territory 
despite the protests of Nicaragua. Since 9 December 1825 this large 
portion of Nicaragua has become an accepted part of her southern 
neighbor. 2 Other accomplishments of the Mora years include great 
gains in public education, the development of new ports and principal 
highways - the victims of decades of neglect - and the establishment of 
the nation's first industries. Bancroft writes: "Costa Rica had 
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made great progress from both the material and intellectual points of 
view. 113 And by the end of Mora's progressive administration, "The 
State at this time was enjoying liberty and perfect freedom of the 
press. It was the asylum of the exiles from other Central and South 
American 4 states." Upon termination of his first term, Mora was 
unanimously reelected as chief executive and served until 1833, "siempre 
con el mismo tino, honradez y prudencia, que le valieron el respeto y 
admiracio'n de sus conciudadanos y toda la America Central. 115 
As the popular Mora left office the Asamblea selected Jos' Rafael 
Gallegos as his successor. Ten years of relative tranquility were 
shattered, however, by a return to the partisanship that existed at the 
time of the Civil War. From the first day in office Gallegos was the 
victim of violent opposition, largely based upon the provincial esp{ritu 
lugarefio of San JosJ' s jealous rivals. 6 In an attempt to compromise, 
Gallegos proposed legislation which revived the policy of rotating the 
capital between the four major cities. The Ley de ambulancia provided 
for a term of one year for each city to become the nation's capital. 
Unsatisfied with anything less than a permanent home in Cart ago, the 
opposition continued to press Gallegos and harassed him until the 
beleaguered chief executive resigned his post. The Asemblea chose Costa 
Rica's leading 
7 
replacement. 
Republican, Braulio Carrillo, as Gallego's 
Carrillo quickly proved himself to be a strong and patriotic leader 
during his first year in office. Political hostility increased during 
the year, and when the capital was returned on a permanent basis to San 
8 
Jose' at Carrillo's direction, Costa Rica's Second Civil War erupted. 
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The government skirmished with armies made up of citizens of the other 
three cities along the banks of the R{o Virilla in battles which 
involved five thousand men. Carrillo's forces eventually prevailed and 
established a legacy for the chief executive as the democratic protector 
of unity and the rule of law. Although jealousies exist even today, the 
victory of San Jos~ in 1836 marked the end of violence between the 
cities and Carrillo receives the credit. 9 
After Carrillo's legitimate term of office expired, he seized power 
and returned to office through the force of arms. In Costa Rica's first 
military coup, Carrillo overthrew Manuel Aguilar after the latter had 
served but one year of his term. Carrillo was a popular dictator and 
must be credited with a number of important contributions to the 
development of the . 10 nation. Among the accomplishments of Carrillo 
are the creation of a new system for laws replacing: 
anachronistic Spanish laws. and the establishment of and 
orderly public administration without lining his own pockets. His 
other great accomplishment, which had lasting repercussions on the 
nation't 1economic, social and political history, was to promote 
coffee. 
Carrillo encouraged the development of Costa Rica's infant coffee 
industry but he is remembered more importantly as the man who insulted 
Francisco / Morazan, 
Central America. 
the former president of the United Provinces of 
r Morazan, a Honduran, had succeeded the first 
president, Josi Arce after a series of revolts in 1826-1827 culminated 
in a military coup. The legacy of Morazan is that of a frustrated 
dreamer unable to unite the disparate factions of Central American 
politics, whose liberal and progressive programs were ahead of their 
time. Among the laws proposed by Morazan were those which abolished the 
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ecclesiastical courts, dissolved religious orders, seized unproductive 
Church properties, and introduced civil marriage, jury trials and 
religious tolerance. Unfortunately, most / of Morazan' s proposals were 
rejected by the respective national presidents or assemblies of the 
Central American . 12 nations. The previously mentioned incident 
d d . M ,,, ' . 1 13 occurre uring orazan s ex1 e. 
En route to an eventual asylum in Peru, Moraz,n's contingent 
stopped at Puntarenas, Costa Rica and requested provisions and an 
audience with President Carrillo. Carrillo allowed the crew to make 
their purchases and permitted a few members of the party to remain in 
Costa Rica, but he refused to meet with Moraza"'n and denied the proud 
exile permission to disembark. In two years, Morazan returned to Costa 
Rica intent upon the overthrow of Carrillo with the help of a large 
group of domestic opponents of the dictator. With a force of five 
hundred men, "' Morazan landed at Caldera and began marching towards San 
Jose. En route he encountered the Costa Rican army and its leader, 
General Vicente Villasenor, one of his former lieutenants. At El 
Jocote, near La Garita de Alajuela, Villasenor turned over his army to 
Morazfn without a shot being fired and agreed to support the presidency 
of Moraz£n and the exile of Carrillo. The treacherous Pacto del Jocote 
"' led within five months to a popular uprising against Morazan, who was 
captured and shot. At his side was the traitor Villasenor, providing 
evidence the Costa Ricans could tolerate a criollo dictator but would 
14 just as soon do without the usurpation of the patria by a Honduran 
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A series of presidents during the rest of the 1840's led to one of 
the most highly respected and beloved of Costa Rican presidents, Juan 
Rafael Mora, the hero of the Campana Nacional. In Costa Rican childrens' 
history texts the most significant event in the century following 
independence is the Campana Nacional, in which an invasion force led by 
American filibuster William Walker was routed by heroic patriots. The 
importance of the event to the national psyche is immeasurable; Costa 
Ricans have had few historical opportunities to test their mettle in 
combat against foreigners. The creation of a national enemy, Walker, 
united the populace in 1855 and his defeat greatly inflated national 
pride. The details of the campaign against Walker are somewhat less 
flattering than nationalistic historians might concede, but the fact of 
Costa Rica's overwhelming success is undeniable. An army led by General 
Jose Joaqu!n Mora, the president's brother, defeated part of Walker's 
force at Santa Rosa in northern Costa Rica and chased the remaining 
troops to Rivas, Nicaragua. Costa Ricans were responsible for the 
eventual departure of Walker from Central America in 1857 and are 
justifiably proud of their role. 15 
The truth about Walker's brief sojourn in Nicaragua is complex and 
requires an understanding of 1850 American politics. Sentiment in 
the southern states favored the annexation of Central American or 
Caribbean nations as sources of new land and labor, as slavery in the 
United States entered its twilight era. While the United States grew 
rapidly in population and social progress, the nations to its south 
languished in chaos and stagnated politically due to continuous unrest. 
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The lack of strong leadership was cited most often as the cause of Latin 
America's malaise and Walker saw his mission as bringing American 
virtues and progress to the region. Once petty internal rivalries were 
put aside each nation could finally proceed with its development. 16 
Costa Rican President Mora is portrayed as hero in modern Latin 
American historiography because he declared war on the filibusters and 
his small nation's forces defeated the armies of the American. In 
reality, General Mora's force of nearly three thousand men faced only 
three hundred unseasoned mercenaries led by an inexperienced German, 
Schlessinger, while Walker and the main body of troops remained in 
Nicaragua. On 20 March 1856 General Mora's men defeated Schlessinger 
and followed the retreating remnants to Rivas. 17 In the battle which 
followed on 11 April 1856 Walker's combined forces were again defeated 
b h C R . 18 R h h h. . h d f y t e osta 1cans. at er t an pursue is vanqu1s e oe to 
Granada, General Mora returned to a hero's welcome in San Jose', taking 
with him a deadly gift from Walker, cholera. The disease proved far 
more effective than Walker's bullets in decimating the ranks of the 
Costa Rican army and causing widespread suffering within Costa Rica. 19 
Walker rested in Granada and regrouped his men to begin an assault 
upon Managua. After declaring himself president of Nicaragua, Walker 
seized Managua and entered into negotiations with American tycoon 
Cornelius Vanderbilt concerning the concession of transit rights between 
the Atlantic and the Pacific via the R{o San Juan. Vanderbilt 
envisioned the dramatic shortening of the voyage from America's Atlantic 
to Pacific coasts and the profit commiserate with a transit across 
Nicaragua. Vanderbilt held the concession prior to Walker's arrival and 
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actively opposed him in his quest to unify the Nicaraguans, aware that 
dealing with a minor local faction was infinitely less complicated than 
making an agreement with a unified government under Walker. Walker, on 
the other hand, saw the transit concession as an excellent source of 
revenue for his impoverished Nicaragua, and planned to present a united 
Nicaragua and transit agreement to President Millard Fillmore in hopes 
20 
of securing American aid and support. In an attempt to bolster his 
standing among politicians in the United States, Walker made the biggest 
mistake of his blighted career, and endorsed the institution of slavery 
in C 1 Am . 21 entra erica. 
Outraged Latin democrats condemned Walker's slavery position and 
assembled an expeditionary force to invade Nicaragua from El Salvador. 
In Costa Rica, President Mora again issued a call for volunteers, and 
sent an army of several thousand north to engage Walker. The combined 
forces of the opposition soundly defeated Walker at Rivas, 11 April 1857 
and accomplished the removal of the foreigner from Central American 
soil. Walker was granted safe conduct back to the United States, where 
he began to assemble another force to invade Nicaragua. After several 
attempts to return to Central America were thwarted by the American 
government, Walker succeeded in capturing the port of Trujillo, Honduras 
with a small force. Soon his supp lies were exhausted, however, and 
expected reinforcements were detained by the United State Navy. Walker 
was convinced to surrender to Honduran authorities by the local British 
naval commander once he had received assurances of fair treatment for 
his men. Despite promises to the contrary by the deceitful British 
22 
officer, the Hondurans promptly shot Walker. 
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As a result of Costa Rica's role in defeating Walker, diplomatic 
relations with Nicaragua improved dramatically and enmity surrounding 
the 1825 annexation of Guanacaste province subsided. The long standing 
dispute over the exact northern boundary was resolved after lengthy 
negotiations mediated by El Salvador. Generals Jose' Marfa Canas and 
Ma"ximo Jerez proposed a compromise which was accepted by both nations 
and signed into law 15 April 1858. The Treaty of Canas-Jerez called for 
free access to the R{o San Juan but placed the river entirely within 
Nicaragua, the southern river bank becoming the northern boundary of 
Costa Rica. In return, Nicaragua formally renounced her claims upon 
Guanacaste province. Although disputes have arisen at times over the 
question of territorial sovereignty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
the Treaty of Canas-Jerez remains in force today and has withstood the 
f . 23 passage o time 
Election results in 1859 returned President Mora to office for an 
unprecedented third term and reflected popular support for the hero of 
the Campana Nacional. When Mora enacted a series of liberal reforms, 
passed as a result of the president's popularity, conservative opponents 
began plotting against him. Dissension from the clergy prompted Mora to 
exile Archbishop Llorente and several of his supporters and, as a 
result, the president incurred the wrath of conservatives. Mora also 
alienated Costa Rica's wealthy oligarchy when he attempted to establish 
a national bank. Conservatives enlisted the aid of army comm.anders and 
overthrew Mora 14 August 1859 in an unpopular coup. Fern!ndez Guardia 
writes: "La revolucib"n de agosto de 1859 fu/ obra de unos pocos Y es 
indudable que la gran mayor!a del pueblo costarricense miro'con 
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pesadumbre la ca(da de Mora, Mora was replaced by 
conservative Jose'Mar{a Montealegre but vowed revenge from his exile in 
El Salvador and attempted to organize a popular uprising in Costa Rica. 
In February, Montealegre was ab le to contain a minor revolt in 
Guanacaste but a more serious problem arose in September 1860. On 14 
September the town of Esparza sided with Mora and on 16 September the 
exile arrived in Puntarenas with expectations of widespread popular 
support. President Montealegre sent General M!ximo Blanco to engage 
the former president and after a series of very bloody battles, the 
government troops prevailed and captured Mora, who was executed several 
25 days later. 
Montealegre and his successor, JesU's Jime"'nez, served Costa Rica 
until 1870 as president and dictator, vacillating between popular 
democracy and authoritarian rule. Although both men toyed with 
constituent government, neither was willing to accept dissent nor 
opposition and Costa Rica appeared to be heading in the direction of 
h f C 1 Am • d · 11 · 26 t e rest o entra er1ca, cau 1 1smo. 
A steady decline in democratic values followed the election of Mora 
to a third term and his subsequent overthrow. Costa Rica faced a 
critical historical juncture on 27 April 1870 when General To~s 
Guardia, one of the military heroes of the Campana Nacional against 
Walker and the filibusters, seized the artillery barracks in San Jose 
and forced the resignation of President Jim~nez. Guardia's coup merits 
consideration as the most significant event of the latter part of the 
century and surely ranks with the First Civil War and the Campana 
Nacional in relevance to Costa Rica's democratic development. 
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Paradoxically, it required the services of a ca reer mi li t arist t o 
set Costa Rica on her course after a decade of divergence f rom 
democratic ideals. Guardia duplicated the end result o f his 
predecessor, Gregorio Jose Ram!'rez fifty years earlier, but employed 
strikingly different means. Guardia preserved Costa Rica's democra cy 
through force, censorship and exile, and dissent and oppo s ition ceased 
to exist. The wealthy oligarchy, long an obstacle to liberalization and 
social progress, met their match in Guardia. Among the r eforms 
introduced by the dictator were land redistribution, the construct ion o f 
many schools and the improvement of public education, a revised military 
code II y se hicieron ot ras muchas ref ormas dignas de c a luroso 
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ap lauso. 11 Guardia sponsored the construction of railroads t o t he 
Pacific coast, telegraph lines connecting Costa Rica to the r es t of 
Central America, and developed commercial markets in Europe, the United 
States, and South America. As Fern~ndez Guardia writes: 11 ••• ninguna 
ha sido de transcendencia para Costa Rica como la del genera l Guardia , 
que transformd completamente el modo de ser del pa!s. Su obra fue' 
extensa y meritoria en muchas de sus partes, aunque tambien e s acreedora 
de 28 sever a censuras." The greatest defects of Gu a rd ia ' s t enure as 
dictator were increased corruption and the ins titution of a vast 
governmental bureaucracy filled with cronies of the general. Modern 
Costa Rica's economic crisis, arising out of an unmanageable pub lie 
sector, traces its beginning to Guardia's creation of a large central 
government, with its costly bureaucracy. 
In the years following the Guardia dictatorship t he resort to 
military rule was abandoned, with one ex cept i on in 1917 . Although 
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Guardia's immediate successor was a general, ,. / Prospero Fernandez, the 
result of Guardia's assault upon the oligarchy was a liberalization of 
Costa Rican economic, social and political life. From 1882 until 1917 
democratic reforms improved the average citizen's standing at the 
expense of Costa Rica's wealthy elite. A liberal "Generation of 1889" 
grew out of Guardia's dictatorship and became the political leaders of 
the twentieth century. The conservative factions in Costa Rica, which 
included clerics and the oligarchy, were gradually displaced from their 
disproportionately powerful positions of importance. 29 
The most important economic benefit of the Guardia dictatorship was 
the completion of the Atlantic railroad. By 1882, construction of a 
national rail system from San Jos<f to the Pacific coast had been 
accomplished, and a section from Puerto Lim6n on the Caribbean to 
Carrillo in Costa Rica's interior left only a section of track from San 
Jos/ to Carrillo to be completed. Lack of funds forced the postponement 
of the project and the substitution of a highway in the unfinished 
section rather than rails. The V{a mixta al Atlantico was plagued by 
washouts and disasters during its brief existence, and plans were begun 
30 
to reroute the railroad and complete its construction. The American 
owner and genius behind the railroad was Minor Cooper Keith, a 
fascinating individual who later created the United Fruit Company after 
31 
a career as engineer and entrepreneur. London financing allowed the 
completion of the railroad from San Jose' to Puerto Limdn, via Cartage 
and Turrialba, and Keith rode in the first engine which completed 
passage on 7 December 1890. 32 Within ten years, thousands of acres of 
the eastern portion of Costa Rica were planted with bananas and a second 
35 
major export crop contributed to the nation's export earnings and 
33 development. 
The wealthy coffee producers were unwilling to diversify into the 
new crop, which led to the first major investment in Costa Rica by 
foreigners. Although Keith's holdings were the largest, other foreign 
nationals capable of investing the vast sums necessary to start 
production began buying the properties of native Costa Ricans. As the 
Biesanzes wrote "The banana-producing areas of Limbn Province, 
therefore, began as isolated enclaves under foreign control, and 
remained so 34 for decades." The presence of outsiders upset liberal 
Costa Ricans of the "Generation of 1889," and the campaign of President 
Ricardo Jime'nez against the United Fruit Company in 1907, 1908, and 
1909 "es uno de los grandes mementos del liberalismo costarricense," 
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according to Eugenio Rodriquez Vega. 
The age of liberalism in early twentieth century Costa Rica is 
summarized by the same author as follows: 
En estos anos hay en general un gran respeto a las libertades 
formales, apego a la legalidad, apoyo a la educaci6n pablica, 
oposici6n de algunos destacados liberales a los monopolios 
extranjeros, una campana electoral ejemplar en 1909, la importa~ge 
reforma constitucional que afirma el vote popular directo .•. 
The presidencies of Cleto Gonzflez Vfquez (1906-1910) and Ricardo 
Jime'nez Oreamino (1910-1914) marked the apogee of early twentieth 
century Costa Rican liberalism. The election of Jime'nez, who received 
over ninety percent of the votes in an honest contest, was the first of 
37 his three terms as the nation's leader. 
Three men divided the vote in 1914, which resulted in the selection 
of Alfredo Gonza"lez Flores, the Primer Designado, for the period 
1914-1918. The choice of 
, 
Gonzalez 
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Flores divided the country into 
personalist political factions and led to a military coup against the 
ineffective president, 27 January 1917. The Secretario de Guerra y 
Marina, Federico Alberto Tinoco Granados was the leader of the coup, and 
he declared himself president 1 April 1917. Costa Rica once again felt 
itself in the grips of an authoritarian dictator, but unlike the 
progressive Toma's Guardia, Tinoco was a tyrant who quickly alienated the 
populace. Fernfndez Guardia writes "Su temperamento despbtico y su poca 
probidad alejaron pronto de su gobierno a la mayor parte de los que lo 
h b r d 1 . . . "38 a 1an apoya o a pr1nc1p10. After a series of violent uprisings 
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against his regime, the dictator fled to Europe. 
Costa Rica drifted to the political left during the 1920's, as the 
nation returned to her democratic course. In 1928, a wave of 
nationalism swept over Costa Rica, with the principal objects of 
crio llo anger being the United Fruit Company, the Northern Railway 
Company (foreign-owned and operated) and various domestic electric 
. d b f . 40 companies owne y oreigners. The first banana worker's union was 
organized and the progressive Liga Civ{ca began in that year. Among the 
provisions of the apolitical league's statement of purpose were articles 
which stated: 
d) Combatir los monopolios de todo g~nero prohibidos por la 
constitucidn, y las concesiones que tiendan a constituir 
privilegios, por ser estos manifestamente nocivos a la 
iniciativa particular y al libre desenvolvimiento del 
pa1s. 
e) Ejercer sanci6n efectiva contra todos aquellos 
costarricenses o extranjeros que en alguna forma 
comprometan los derechos o k~s intereses de la 
nacionalidad costarricense. 
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The apolitical movement was given tremendous impetus by the arrival 
in Costa Rica of v{ctor Ra~l Haya de la Torre. For three months the 
exiled Peruvian lived in Costa Rica, giving "muchas conferencias en la 
Escue la de Derecho, en la Escue la Normal de Heredia, en teatros y en 
cualquier otro lugar donde quiere o{rsele. 1141 The popularity of the 
liberal movement dismayed the conservative oligarchy, who generally 
welcomed foreign investments and opposed the labor movement, which was 
branded "communistic." President Cleto Gonza'.lez (1928-1932) 
succeeded in alienating both the progressives and the conservatives with 
his vacillation between the two factions, although his legacy improved 
considerably after his term of office. Ricardo Jimlnez followed 
, , 
Gonzalez Viquez as president, but election day shenanigans by losing 
candidate Manuel Castro Quesada marred the results. As Costa Rican 
historian Eduardo Oconotrillo writes: 
Todo el pa{s repudia el alzamiento • • • Un saldo tr!gico de 
15 muertos y 36 heridos deja 'el Bellavistazo,' nombre que da 
la Historia a este capitulo absurdo y lamentable de esta 
campafia presidencial • • • 
Manuel Castro Quesada pretendi6 con el cuartelazo que el 
pa!s se levantara en armas contra don Cleta y desconociere el 
triunfo de Jim~nez Oreamuno. Sucedio todo lo contrario, y al 
rendirse les dice a sus companeros ' ••• nose ha respondido 
al gesto her~ico de ustedes y no pod!a4~eguir en lo que 
resultar{a un gran sacrificio inutil.' 
The administration of Jimenez, his third term as president of Costa 
Rica, was plagued by the worldwide economic depression of the 1930's and 
by domestic turmoil. Worker discontent in the banana zones, fueled by 
United Fruit Company's repression of unionization and the radicalism of 
labor leaders, led to massive strikes in 1934. The via lence of the 
foreign corporation in reaction to labor protests galvanized 
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nationalistic sentiments within Costa Rica, and produced a number of 
dramatic changes in society. Legislation which not only permitted but 
encouraged the union movement was enacted and taxes levied upon banana 
44 producers were increased despite conservative protests. 
The most significant result of the great banana strike of 1934, in 
which over 15,000 workers participated, was the foundation of the Costa 
Rican Connnunist Party and its rapid growth following the strike. The 
party had been founded 16 January 1931 by a group of intellectuals and 
workers, led by Manuel Mora Valverde, but languished outside the 
political mainstream of Costa Rican life until the strike. When Unit d 
Fruit failed to construct a hospital in Siquirres and company stores in 
a number of other locations, as specified in the national contract with 
the government, the protest 45 began. With the support of the 
Communist Party, the workers prevailed. As Manuel Rojas Bolanos writes: 
••• los obreros salieron victoriosos, pues en el Contrato-
Ley No. 30, del 10 de setiembre de 1934, se incorporaron la 
mayor{a de sus peticiones, adem.{s de que se reconocid' 
oficialmente la existencia de la Federaci6n de Trabajadores 
Bananeros del Atl~ntico. Pero lo mis importante fue el 
aprendizaje alcanzado en el campo de la lucha de clases por 
ese sector proletariado costarricense, desde entonces el de 
mayor conciencia de clase y por tanto el mcfs combativo. La 
posicitn del Partido Comunista, como dirigente y y~5tavoz de 
la clase obrera, indudablemente que se fortalecio. 
One of the spiritual leaders of the strike was Carlos Luis Fallas, whose 
excellent Mamita Yunai, a condemnation of the banana worker's lot, is 
required reading in modern Costa Rican education. Fa l las went on to 
distinguish himself as a labor leader, congressional deputy and fighting 
commander of government forces in the 1948 Civil War . 47 
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To avoid the anti-communist opposition of Costa Rican 
conservatives, the Communist Party changed its name to El Bloque de 
Obreros y Campesinos in 1934, thus distancing itself from the 
ultraleftist position of International Communism. In 1935, however, the 
VII Congress in Moscow changed its point of view to accept accommodation 
with non-communist democratic parties, and the Costa Ricans became 
fraternal members of the International movement. As Mora wrote in 1936, 
"Nos oponemos / " resueltamente al trasplante a nuestro pa1s de formulas 
que no caben en nuestra / . estructura econom1ca, social y l " . .,48 po 1t1ca. 
Although opposed to capitalism, the proletarian revolution was relegated 
to a secondary position in the fight against imperialism and Fascism. 
The Costa Rican communists were prohibited from taking their 
seats in the 1938 Congress by conservative President Leon Carte's Castro, 
an implacable enemy of Communism and supporter of National Socialism. 
Cort~s had won the election of 1936 by employing the dirtiest campaign 
tactics the nation had seen. As Oconotrillo writes: 
E . - L~ C ' .. l' ~ n esta campana eon ortes se conv1rt10 en e campeon 
de anticomunismo'. Presentt al comunismo ante el electorado 
como una insidiosa y enganosa conspiracio'n internacional que 
intentaba fomentar la revoluci6n en todo el mundo. En Costa 
Rica representaba una amenaza contra lo ~s sag~ado: 1~9 familia, la religi6n y las instituciones democraticas. 
Partly as a result of the official suppression of the will of 
middle class voters, which had begun to support the communists, the 
power of Obreros Campesinos increased. By the 1940 presidential 
elections, the party received not only the vote of organized labor 
also "el voto de sectores de la pequefia burgues{a, 
but 
descontentos con la situaciO'n del pa!s y con los partidos pO'liticos 
tradicionales • • ... so The popular discontent with the personalismo 
of Costa Rican politics accounts for the impressive success of the 
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communists. Rojas Bolanos writes "En menos de diez anos de existencia 
hab{an logrado casi duplicar su apoyo y se hab!an convertido en un 
importante movimiento pol!tico en el pa{s."51 Le6n Cort~s, on the 
other hand, began to lose popularity almost upon being elected, as he 
changed from populist to friend of the oligarchy, and became, as 
Oconotrillo writes "el aute'ntico caudillo • • • " 52 
The best explanation for the popularity of Mora's party is found in 
John Patrick Bell's Crisis in Costa Rica-- The 1948 Revolution: 
In part, Mora's prestige and that of other Communist leaders, 
notably Fallas, was a result of their dedication and personal 
integrity. Also of importance, however, was the domestic 
origin and orientation of the party ••. Even the staunchest 
opponents of the pre-1948 communism refer to it as comunismo 
criollo, thus distinguishing it from the less independent and 
clandestine party that operated subsequently. • • The party 
defended the electoral rights of all citizens, and in 
particular, attempted to safeguard the rights of labor and of 
the peasants. These causes along with the caliber of its 
l:adersg~p won it acceptance among respectable Costa 
Ricans. 
American historian Charles D. Ameringer discusses Cortis' rapid decline 
in popularity as follows: 
Cortis, although a civilian, enjoyed the title of caudillo, 
and he gave the oligarchy the tougher rule it wanted, revealing 
paternalism's sharp edges. He harassed the Communist Party and refused 
to permit Manuel Mora, elected as deputy from San Jose, to be seated in 
the nat_ional . congre3~· Besides being stern, Cortes displayed marked 
pro-Nazi sentiments. 
Thus the stage was set for the turbulent 1940's, in which Costa 
Rica's democratic course would again face obstacles. Although the 
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elections which followed Gregorio Josl Ram{rez' heroism in 1823 were 
occasionally democratic, they often led to dictatorship, caudillismo or 
minority rule. Personalities continued to dominate in the twentieth 
century, as evidenced by the three presidential terms of Ricardo 
Jimlnez. Although Costa Rican politics tended to represent popular will 
to a greater degree than her neighbors, thousands of illiterate peasants 
continued to live in abject poverty without access to health or 
educational facilities. It was this subclass of citizens, as well as 
the unionized agricultural workers, to whom the egalitarian political 
philosophy of Costa Rica's CoIIUilunist Party appealed. Class conflict 
would only be averted by a dramatic improvement in the life of the 
campesino; in this way the message of the communists could be rendered 
less effective. In the 1940 presidential election, the candidate who 
offered to address the pressing social problems of the nation was Rafael 
Angel Calder~n Guardia. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TURBULENT 1940'S 
The 1940 Costa Rican presidential election involved Partido 
Republicano Nacional candidate Rafael Angel Calder6'n Guardia, Manuel 
Mora Valverde of El Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos and Virgilio Salazar 
Leiva of the obscure Guanacaste Partido Confraternidad. Calder6'n 
Guardia was President ~ Cortes' handpicked successor, but advocated a 
liberal Christian Democratic program of social reforms which distanced 
him from Cortis' legacy as caudillo and his conservative record. 
Calder6n Guardia received over eighty percent of the vote in a landslide 
victory, with Mora a distant 1 second. The margin of Calderbn 
Guardia's triumph has been interpreted as reflective of popular 
discontent with the harsh authoritarian rule of Cort~ and support for 
Calder6n Guardia's promised liberal social welfare program, which 
explained the massive turnout. 
President Calderon Guardia was a devout Roman Catholic who was 
introduced to fundamental ideas of social justice while a medical 
student in Brussels, Belgium, and as a student at the Catholic 
University in Louvain, France "he had been influenced by the new social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church, as expressed in the encyclical Rerum 
2 Nov arum." Calder6n Guardia's proposed social welfare 
alienated his former supporters, the wealthy coffee planters. 
reforms 
Costa 
Rica's oligarchy objected to the president's social legislation for two 
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principal reasons: they preferred to maintain the status quo in which a 
select few controlled the nation, and knew that Calder6n Guardia's 
reforms would be expensive. The latter consideration was perhaps the 
most offensive to an elite which distinguished itself with its 
tightfistedness. 3 
Calder6n Guardia's promise of relief for Costa Rica's masses made 
him one of the nation's most popular presidents. Widespread illness and 
poverty in rural areas assured the support of Costa Rica's campesinos 
for ~ Calderon Guardia's social welfare 4 program. But despite 
widespread popular support, the opposition of the oligarchy prevented 
the passage of reform legislation. The opponents of the president were 
unwittingly aided by Calder6n Guardia himself as the major criticism of 
his administration appeared in 1941. Rumors of graft and corruption 
began to gain substance as the extent of the president's involvement 
became pub lie knowledge. Ameringer writes "Ca lder6'n not only retained 
the spoil system but placed the most transparent sort of syncophants and 
hangers-on in public office. 115 The president employed his brother 
Francisco as Ministro de Gobernacion and awarded many public contracts 
to friends. Francisco earned the nickname "Paco a medias," because he 
was "rumored to demand a fifty percent cut from those receiving 
6 , 
government favors." As one example of the corruption of the Calderon 
Guardia administration, there exists the case of the disposal of Axis 
properties during World War Two. 
When a German submarine attacked a cargo vessel in Puerto Limdn, 
national outrage against Axis nationals within Costa Rica erupted into 
violence, and as a patriotic gesture Caldertn Guardia seized their many 
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properties. Public support for the president's action soon turned to 
anger, however, when it became known cronies of the president had taken 
possession of numerous properties for little or no payment. 7 
The U-boat attack on the moored banana freighter, the San Pablo, 
shocked the sheltered nation, and the loss of twenty four men trapped 
within the vessel provoked bitter 8 anger. During the activities 
planned to commemorate the American Independence Day, patriotic rallies 
became focal points for popular hostility. After a series of 
inflammatory speeches by members of "anti-totalitarian organizations," 
mobs of Costa Rican citizens went on a looting and window breaking 
rampage in downtown San Josi. Among the speakers who provoked the 
violence were President Caldero'n Guardia and Manuel Mora. The discourse 
of Mora was the most incendiary, as he demanded arms and military 
preparation for citizen's militias. 9 As The New York Times reported 
on 6 July 1942: 
Thousands of San Jos~residents moved through the 
night, systematically wrecking Axis-owned properties. 
windows were shattered in scores of commercf5l houses. 
movement spread quickly into the provinces. 
streets last 
Hundreds of 
The . . • 
The most significant result of the destruction which took place in 
Costa Rica on 4 July 1942 was the emergence of the future leader of 
contemporary Latin America's foremost democracy: Jose Figueres 
11 Ferrer. San Jos~ merchants, although initially subdued and fearful 
of continued violence, began to protest the government's role in 
, 
provoking the mob. Conservative opponents of Calderon also objected to 
the participation of Mora's communists in the violence. The businessmen 
took out advertisements in the nation's leading newspaper which 
denounced ". 
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la falta de previsi6n, la pasivida d de la policfa , e l 
tono incendiario de los discursos, ••• " 12 
The introduction of mob violence into Costa Rican politics was a 
new development which many citizens protested, but the loudes t and mos t 
significant of the voices raised against Calder6n Guardia was t hat of 
Figueres. In a radio discourse the evening of 8 July, which was cut 
short when the police interceded, Figueres condemned the admini s tra t ion 
for having permitted the rioting. The broadcast not only criticized t he 
riots, but went so far as to issue a blanket condemnation o f the 
government, the first such attack during the first two years o f Calder~n 
Guardia's wartime administration. Figueres attacked the gove r nment' s 
economic mismanagement, corruption and the failure to enact t he 
long-promised social reform legislation which Calderon Guardia has u sed 
as a vehicle for election in 1940. 13 
The outraged President Calder6n Guardia had Figueres arrested and 
threatened to charge him with treason under emergency war powe r s . Civil 
liberties had been suspended with the declaration of war, which meant a 
traitor faced lengthy incarceration regardless of guilt or i nnocence . 
Under threat of imprisonment, Figueres accepted the advice of his 
friend Jorge Hine and acceded to the recommendation o f t he government 
that he submit to voluntary exile. In so doing, Figue r es became Costa 
Rica's only citizen exiled during the War. 14 With political neophyte 
Figueres thus eliminated, the president turne d h is a t tention to 
recapturing popular support. 
Midterm elections in early 1942 dramatized t he administration's 
faltering popularity, and President Caldertn Guardia sought to regain 
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lost votes with a comprehensive program of social warfare, the Garant!as 
Sociales, which he announced at the end of the year. 15 In search of 
enhanced legislative power, the president decided to enlist the aid of 
Mora's Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos. The communists supported 
Calderbn Guardia's social welfare program, a legislative program they 
had advocated since their foundation in 1931. And despite the 
communists' opposition to every administration since the party's 
inception, including Calderon Guardia's, it became obvious the program 
of Garantias Sociales was doomed to fail without the support of the 
communists. In addition, the enhanced political power which accrued to 
the communists by participation in the government gave them heretofore 
unheard-of respectability and prestige. 16 
With the aid of militants in the streets and legislative support in 
the Asemblea, the president succeeded in the passage of his long-awaited 
social code. Great advances were made in health care, education, labor 
rights, social security and retirement benefits. Modern Costa Rica's 
exemplary social welfare system traces its roots to Calderon Guardia's 
G ,. s . 1 17 arant ias ocia es. As he rode a growing wave of popular support 
for his programs, the president sought to further enhance his 
administration's prestige with a shrewd political maneuver. Added 
respectability came with the open pronouncements of support for the 
Garant{as Sociales by leading Church authorities, including the 
· ~ , 1 s b . 18 Archbishop of San Jose, Monsenor Victor Manue ana ria. The 
alliance of the Catholic Church, the Partido Republicano Nacional and 
1 V. . 19 the communists became known as El Bloque de a 1ctor1a. 
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Opposition to the Calder6n Guardia administration was widely 
scattered as Costa Rica approached the 1944 presidential elections and 
had little chance of success against the strength of the Bloqu e de l a 
Victoria. The principal opponents were the conservative oligarchy and 
some rural poor, convinced of the "communistic" nature o f the o ff i cial 
alliance by the inflaIIllllatory campaign speeches o f pres i dential 
candidate LeO'n / 20 Cortes. Of greater importance to the na tion ' s 
political future, however, was an ostensibly apolitical group o f 
~ intellectual opponents of the Calderon Guardia administration , El Centro 
para el Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales. 
The Centro was conceived as an intellectual organiza t ion , where 
national problems could be studied along with i nterna tional 
philosophical solutions, in hope of formulating a distinc tive, na t ive 
political philosophy for Costa Rica. Membership was limi ted (by 
affinity rather than by design) to the vital and e nergetic genera tion of 
young Costa Ricans who were dedicated to egalitarianism with democ racy . 
The mentor and spiritual leader of the young men o f the Cen tro was t he 
noted Costa Rican educator and poet, Roberto Brenes Mes:n. Mes/n had 
taught Spanish literature at Northwestern University fo r twent y years 
and returned to his homeland to advise a new generation o f Costa Ricans 
"who felt a sense of destiny." 21 
The Centre's fundamental liberalism was tempered only by its 
militant anti-coIIllllunism, one element of its politica l philosophy which 
attracted members of Costa Rica's disgruntled mi ddle class 22 Among 
the influences upon Centro philosophy were the liberal movements in 
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Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico and the United States. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal was very important, but perhaps the most profo und 
contribution to Centro philosophy was the Aprista movement of Pe ru. As 
Eugenio Rodr{guez Vega writes: "Pero nada los conmueve tanto como l a 
r , ~ ~ 
vida y las ideas de Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, politico, ideologo y 
escritor, The philosophy of the Centro has bee n summar i zed 
by American political scientist Burt H. English as follows: 
a) Effective suffrage and honest elections; 
b) Reformist economics, with government intervention to 
regulate capital; 
c) Support for President Calderon's social ref o rms; 
d) The introduction of Aprista thought into Cos ta Rica ; and , 
e) Strong support of the cooperative movement. 24 
Initially, the Centro was a philosophical "thinking man ' s club," 
unconcerned with active participation in the political proces s. As an 
apolitical group during the Second World War, the Centro a ttracted a 
broad spectrum of opponents to Calderon Guardia, especially after t he 
president's formal alliance with Mora's communists in 1942 . 25 When 
the communists dissolved El Bloque de Obreros y Campe s i nos 13 June 1943 
and formed a new party, Vanguardia Popular, Centro opposi t ion to 
C . . "f" d 26 ommunism intensi ie • The Centro remained apolitical during the 
1944 presidential elections, which found off icial Part ido Repub licano 
Nacional candidate Teodoro Picado Michalski f ac i ng Partido Democrata 
candidate Le6n Cort~s. / Former President Cortes f oun d suppor t from the 
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nation's conservative oligarchy but was considered too reactionary for 
liberals of the 27 Centro. After the election, considered by most 
observers to be the most fraudulent in national history, the Centro 
became directly involved in politics for the first time, primarily to 
restore democratic and open elections to Costa Rica. 
It is difficult to understand the rationale behind the massive vote 
fraud of the 1944 presidential election. Perhaps, as the sympathetic 
Calderonista Diputado Jos~ Rafael Montoya explains, " the government's 
supporters felt duty-bound to preserve their hard fought social reforms. 
Cort~s publicly repudiated much of Calder6n Guardia's program of 
Garant1as Sociales, and called for the repeal of social 
legislation." 28 While traveling throughout the countryside, Cortes 
made stump speeches wherever he encountered a pulper{a, denouncing the 
28 
"Communists which had seized control of Costa Rica's democracy." He 
appealed to the rural poor to ". • protect their way of life, their 
religion and their honor from the 
historian John Patrick Bell writes: 
'Red 29 Hordes'." As American 
"(Cortes') tactics were almost 
identical to but more vociferous than those he employed against Octavio 
Beeche, also portrayed as a communist." 30 
The rhetoric of official candidate Picado consisted of accusations 
that Cortes was pro-Axis and an enemy of Costa Rican social progress due 
to his public opposition to the Garant{as Sociales. Cortes had 
expressed limited admiration for National Socialism prior to the War, 
and despite his professed support for the Allied positions after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the charge of Axis sympathizer was 
fatal. 31 The election itself presented voters with a "cruel choice," 
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as Ameringer writes: "Picado guaranteed the social legislation but 
represented a corrupt and arbitrary regime; Carte's defended the 
suffrage but stood for special interest and privilege. Manuel Mora 
declared for the first time in Costa Rica's history, social issues and 
not personalities were at stake. 1132 
Picado defeated Cortls by a significant margin but the opposition 
immediately claimed vote fraud had occurred. ~ Rodriguez Vega writes: 
La eleccio'n del 13 de febrero de 1944 es alga especial, pues 
en esta oportunidad no es que unas mesas, o por parte de un 
organismo electoral, se hayan desconocido los votos populares: ese 
d!a el fraude adquiere caracteres de verdadero escfndalo y la 
presitn of~§ial llega hasta asesinar a algunos que quieren 
impedirlo. 
Although documented cases of government misconduct during the election 
seem to justify opposition claims of fraud, the more reasoned scholarly 
viewpoint holds that the margin of victory, but not the outcome was 
affected by official disfranchisement. Intimidation and acts of 
violence occurred but the popularity of El Bloque de la Victoria proved 
insurmountable for former President Ledn Cort/s. 34 
Public indignation over the fraudulent election was galvanized by 
the 23 May 1944 return of Jose~ Figueres from exile. A populace still 
bitter towards Picado, Calderdn Guardia and Mora perceived in Figueres a 
courageous victim of the government's injustice. Figueres emerged from 
a lifetime of anonymity to become a beacon for every opponent of the 
government (and the communists of the Vanguardia Popular). A 
groundswell of support slowly lifted Figueres' heroism to Olympic 
heights, as everything the former exile did or said was judged worthy of 
extensive journalistic attention. Figueres' activities were portrayed 
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as consistent with his patriotic, egalitarian, democratic and 
anti-communist political philosophy. 35 
The principal beneficiary of Figueres' hero's welcome was the 
. ""' ,,, previously insignificant political party, Accion Democrata, founded in 
June 1943. The party's newspaper, of the same name, began to urge mass 
support for a new "Second Republic," which promised a dramatic 
alternative to the inept and corrupt legacy of Calder&'n Guardia. A 
portion of the hostile rhetoric proposed to prepare traditionally 
passive Costa Ricans for an inevitable violent revolution to eliminate 
Calderonismo (and Communism) from political 36 power. The Centro, 
which had been persuaded to participate in national politics by the vote 
fraud in February 1944, agreed to a merger with Figueres' activist 
Partido Accio'n Dem6crata on 10 March 1945. 37 
was called Social 
, 
Democrata and combined 
The new political party 
the philosophy of the 
intellectual Centro with Figueres' penchant for action. The Partido 
Social Demo'crata proved too tame for Figueres, however, and he left the 
party shortly after its creation to return to "conspiratorial matters." 
As Ameringer writes: "Figueres' counsels never ceased to have the smell 
38 
of gunpowder." 
Figueres received his introduction to politics when exiled to 
Mexico in 1942, since before that time he had occupied himself with his 
farm in the mountains southwest of San Jos{. The farm, christened La 
lucha sin fin, was a textbook example of successful socialism: a 
cooperative venture between management and labor. As Costa Rican 
President Daniel Oduber observed years later, "Figueres was a socialist 
before it was fashionable to be one. 1139 Two years of exile gave 
56 
Figureres an opportunity to further his political knowledge at National 
University in Mexico City, which he spent reading and meeting with a 
variety of fellow exiles from throughout the region. Exchanging with 
other political exiles broadened Figueres' vision and he began to 
dedicate himself to the overthrow of not merely Caldero'n Guardia but 
other Latin American dictators as well. 40 As Bell writes: "Figuer s 
exchanged views, counsel, and promises of help with exiles from other 
nations also residing in Mexico; this interchange led him to a larger 
battle for hemispheric freedom." 41 
The development of Figueres' expanded plan for the democratization 
of the Caribbean nations arose out of conversations held in June 1943 
with Nicaraguan exile Dr. Rosendo Arguello, hijo. 42 The two men 
agreed the only way to deal with the region's hardened military 
dictatorships was with force, rather than resort to the ineffectual 
political process. It seemed logical to begin the regional revolution 
with the weakest of the dictatorships: Calder~n Guardia's. 43 After 
the fall of 
, 
Calderon Guardia, Figueres promised Arguello, the 
dictatorship of General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua would be toppled. 
Upon returning to Costa Rica in 1944, Figueres spent most of his time in 
search of domestic support for the proposed Caribbean revolution. 44 
Midterm elections in 1946 convinced Figueres once again of the 
lengths to which the government would go to maintain itself in power. 
Many of the cantones of Costa Rica witnessed officially-sanctioned 
voting fraud, although most of the blame was attributed to zealous 
Partido Vanguardia Popular militants who were determined to preserve 
hard-fought reforms. President Picado, considered to be fair and 
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honest, was incapable of preventing the disturbance. ( As Rodriguez Vega 
writes: 
A pesar de las irregularidades en muchos lugares del pafs, es 
justo decir que los atropellos no alcanzan la magnitud de dos 
anos atr~s, y que el presidente de la Rep~blica no ampara a 
los responsables y parece es£grzarse sinceramente en presidir 
unas elecciones imparciales. 
Opposition gains in the 1946 elections made the job of governing 
more difficult for Picado, who was incapable of healing the wounds of 
his bitter opponents. Of particular concern was an increase in acts of 
political violence and sabotage. Rightist militants, often in 
conjunction with supporters of Figueres, carried out a campaign of 
violence and intimidation against the 46 government. Street fights 
between youthful supporters and opponents of the government became 
nightly occurrences. The process of polarization which had begun with 
the fraudulent 1944 presidential election began to get out of control, 
encouraged by hostile rhetoric from both sides. 
Tensions erupted into violence during the summer of 1947. An 
attack by rightist youths on a passing train during May Day celebrations 
led to a street battle in the provincial capital of Cartage. The city 
became the site of increasingly violent daily clashes as supporters of 
Picado were subjected to taunts, harassment and in some instances, 
h . 1 . 1 47 p ysica vio ence. An opposition protest march through Cartage's 
business district took an ugly turn when the crowd began to attack 
bystanders suspected of pro-communist leanings. Troops and police from 
neighboring towns arrived to replace the militiamen of Cartage when the 
latter's reluctance to restore order became evident. An unruly mob 
opened fire upon the newly-arrived troops and in the ensuing violence 
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several opposition leaders were assaulted. The ensuing me lee may 
justifiably be considered the opening salvo of the 1948 Civil War. 48 
Reports alleging brutalities and army overreaction disturbed both 
opponents and supporters of the government. The toll from the v io l ence 
in Cartage reached two dead (both soldiers) and fifteen wounde d, many o f 
those seriously. In protest, government opponents called f or a 
voluntary closure of San Josl businesses in solidarity with the woun ded . 
When bank employees joined the protest many neutral comme r c i al 
establishments were forced to shut down for lack of exchange fa c i lit ies . 
The resultant immobilization of Costa Rica's economy brought about a 
swift government response. Army regulars and the police we re cal led 
upon to reopen the banks and a number of shops. A few o f the bus inesses 
owned by leading opponents of the government were vandalized and 
sporadic looting occurred. When business returned to normal 28 J u ly , 
the protest entered its final phase. 49 
In a repetition of a successful tactic utilized during protes t s i n 
1942, hundreds of Costa Rica's leading women marched on the president ' s 
palace. The women demanded an end to the violent politica l cli ma t e and 
waited several hours to see President Picado, to no avail . After 
nightfall, the crowd was dispersed when "unknown pers ons" fired volleys 
of warning shots over the frightened women's heads. The public outrage , 
which condemned acts of terrorism perpetrated agains t Co sta Rican 
womanhood, proved decisive and forced Picado to come to i mmediate terms 
with opposition demands. SO Conferences between the government , 
opposition leaders and the Church resulted in t h e signing of El Pacto 
del Honor, and brought a brief respite from a summer of c ontinuous 
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violence. The agreement guaranteed free elections and turned con trol o f 
the political process over to a (presumably) impartial Tribunal 
Electoral. A complete ban on political activities during the days 
51 preceding the elections was also part of the accord. 
The government's candidate to succeed Picado as president was 
former President Calderbn Guardia, who faced an uphill struggle in his 
quest for another term. In addition to attacks in opposition media 
" charging him with being a connnunist sympathizer, Calderon Guardia was 
still blamed for the fraudulent 1944 presidential election. Memories o f 
his administration's pervasive corruption also plagued the f ormer 
president's campaign. Perhaps the greatest obsta cle to a not he r 
government victory, however, was the new unity of the opposition a nd it s 
choice "' to challenge Calderon Guardia: progressive newspaper pub l isher 
52 Otilio Ulate Blanco. 
Ulate had been chosen at a massive February 1947 political ral ly 
from among the three leading opposition politicians, himself, Fernando 
C C d J "' F. h 1 d. i . . 1 . t 
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astro ervantes an ose igueres, t e ea ing oppos tion mi 1tan • 
The choice of Ulate, in addition to unifying the oppos ition , present ed 
Calder6n Guardia with one major difficulty. Since 1940, the government 
merely had to label its opponents as being pro-Axis or a n enemy o f the 
campesinos to succeed, because of the opposition candi da t es ' political 
stance . ' . v1s-a-v1s the Garant fas Sociales. Ulate had a proven t r ack 
record as a populist, however, and was outspoken i n his support of 
social justice. "Ulate ha sido siempre ~ un politico progresista de 
amplio criterio" writes Rodr{guez Vega. 54 The supporters of Calder6n 
Guardia's candidacy were thus prevented from bringing out their s t andard 
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assortment of campaign slogans and conceded that in this presidential 
campaign, the tactics of the past were inappropriate. 
Disturbed by an increase in anti-government terrorism and 
frustrated in their efforts to portray Ulate as a reactionary, the 
government sought a compromise with the opposition. Ulate himself 
welcomed the talks with the Calderonistas as a viable alternative to the 
increasing bitterness of Costa Rica's political atmosphere. President 
Picado also desired a return to the electoral calm enjoyed in earlier 
elections. Since all parties appeared amenable to a negotiated 
settlement of campaign tensions, Costa Rica's crisis should have been 
resolved pacifically, without the need to pursue a course of violence. 
The talks faltered, however, when several opposition militants sabotaged 
the discussions and refused to participate or negotiate with the 
government. Figueres, for example, would have nothing to do with the 
"communistic" Caldero"n Guardia and demanded a military solution "which 
represented heroism and purity." He urged Costa Ricans to arm 
themselves and to "abandon once and for all the idea of a simple 
political battle. 1155 Attempts at a compromise fell apart as Ulatistas 
withdrew from the talks under pressure from militants. 56 
The good intentions which produced El Pacto after the turbulent 
summer of 1947 provided the citizens of Costa Rica with a modicum of 
optimism. Although militant opponents of the government continued their 
campaign of terrorism, the new year opened peacefully and calm prevailed 
. h 1 . . d 57 in t e pre-e ect1on per10 • Newsweek magazine was prompted to 
predict "the election will probably be decided by ballots, not bullets, 
. 11 b. 1158 following a year which had been except1ona y 1tter. 
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Elections took place 8 February 1948 in an apprehensive atmosphere, 
yet little violence was reported and, in contrast to the two previous 
elections, there were no charges of governmentally inspired fraud. As 
returns started to be reported, opposition candidate Ulate took an early 
lead, and his margin grew throughout the night. Late Sunday evening the 
8th, Caldert'n Guardia conceded defeat as the voter's choice became 
apparent. The next day the government's candidate withdrew his 
concession, however, claiming thousands of his supporters had been 
denied the vote by opposition militants. 
President Picado's brother Ren{, the Ministro de Seguridad P6blica, 
declared that "it had been a crooked election, which did not represent 
59 
the will of the people." Before a recount could occur, a fire swept 
through an old schoolhouse in which the ballots were stored, awaiting 
Tribunal Electoral scrutiny. No one claimed responsibility for the act 
of sabotage, 
1 . 60 e ection. 
which further muddled an already controversial 
Regardless of political affiliation, every Costa Rican 
felt a sense of foreboding as the nation awaited the decision of the 
Tribunal Electoral, which would certify one candidate or the other as 
president. 
On 29 February a divided Tribunal Electoral announced its decision, 
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which awarded the presidency to Ulate. The nation was stunned when 
President Picado disallowed the decision and declared he would remain in 
office until Costa Rica's partisan Asemblea Legislativa could determine 
which candidate had prevailed. Picado's rationale for denying Ulate's 
rightful victory was that Costa Rica's Constitution required a unanimous 
Tribunal Electoral verdict, although in fact, the president was 
. k 62 mista en. 
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When the Asemblea Legislativa met and voted along party lines, the 
decision which awarded Ulate victory was overturned. Contrary to 
Picado's wishes, however, Calder6n Guardia was not selected as 
president, but instead new elections were ordered. Picado was to sit as 
63 lame duck president until the new chief executive was chosen in May. 
Ulate and his supporters protested the decision of the Asemblea 
Legislativa and claimed once again a corrupt administration had denied 
Costa Ricans the vote. Tensions were heightened when Picado's secret 
police chief, the Cuban-born Jos/ Tavio, lay siege to houses in which 
Ulate was seeking refuge. Ulate' s principal political advisor and 
confidant, Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde, was mortally wounded in the 
assault, amidst government claims which blamed the opposition for 
initiating the violence. Ulate vowed revenge, was jailed for a short 
time and then released after the Church and diplomatic personnel 
interceded in his behalf. Over 10,000 citizens joined the Valverde 
funeral procession in a dramatic show of opposition to Picado's 
controversial decisions as Costa Rica appeared headed once again towards 
. 1 64 vio ence. 
Leaders on both sides of Costa Rica's polarized political system 
urged moderation and agreed to censor their own partisan communications 
media while a truce arranged 5 March remained in effect. The bankers 
and conservative businessmen who had the most to lose in a protracted 
internal conflict worked to restore the nation's traditional 
tranquility. Opposition moderates met on a daily basis with Picado, 
Mora, Archbishop Sanabria and members of the diplomatic community as 
confidence in a negotiated settlement replaced the fear of armed 
63 
f . 65 con rontation. Despite the good intentions of Costa Rican leaders, 
however, a truce became impossible as once again, just as in the talks 
preceding the February elections, militant opponents of the government 
prevented a compromise. Unlike the disruptive efforts of the militants 
in 194 7, however, their actions of March 1948 consisted of a military 
assault on government forces which precipitated a Civil War. 66 
Prior to a discussion of the six weeks of Civil War which wracked 
Costa Rica from March until late April 1948, it is necessary to examine 
another factor which further complicated the situation. Had the 
opponents of the Picado government operated in isolation, without 
outside assistance, it is doubtful they could have prevailed. This was 
not the case, however, as external forces came to bear upon Costa Rica 
which proved impossible for President Picado and his small armed forces 
to overcome. The principal obstacle which prevented a quick government 
victory in March 1948 was the participation of the United States of 
America in the conflict. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE COSTA RICAN CIVIL WAR 
The United States of America played a critical role in the 1948 
Costa Rican Civil War. Careful analysis of diplomatic communications, 
internal embassy records, contemporary history and journalism provides 
extensive evidence of the American involvement. The extent of 
' / . Washington s support for the rebels of Jose Figueres and its opposition 
to the government of President Teodoro Picado has never been a matter of 
common knowledge, but historical examination shows a pattern of 
deliberate intervention designed to eliminate the influence of Communism 
and preserve Costa Rica's democratic tradition. 
America's Latin American policy underwent four major changes of 
direction during the twentieth century, from imperialistic "Gunboat" and 
"Dollar" diplomacies to ostensibly benevolent "Good Neighbor" and 
finally, Cold War "Enemy of Communism." Each policy reflected the 
predominant political thinking of its time with the principal 
consideration being the post-Monroe Doctrine American hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere. The motivation behind American imperialism in the 
early part of the century is summarized by American political scientist 
J. Lloyd Mecham as follows: "We cannot overlook the fact that the 
existence of the United States created a bulwark against European 
imperiali~m in the Western Hemisphere. United States imperialism 
protected the hemisphere against Old World imperialistic 
1 powers." 
America felt "certain standards of order and respect for property had to 
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be observed by all governments as members of a civilized community, and 
the United States represented civilization north of the Panama 
2 Canal." President Woodrow Wilson represented "the most repugnant 
aspects of Yankee meddling" in Latin American minds. He had "inherited 
an empire and proceeded to expand it in a righteous spirit of missionary 
diplomacy. " 3 Wilson gradually refined American foreign policy into 
Dollar Diplomacy, but little changed from William Howard Taft to Herbert 
Hoover. As American historian Lester 0. Langley writes of the Hoover 
era: "In the classical mold of industrial statesman, he looked to the 
monocultures to the south as suppliers of raw material for American 
industry. 114 
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president brought about a 
change in direction for America's Latin American policy. Although 
perhaps not as liberal as some sympathizers might claim, the New Deal 
era did bring about changes in the region's perception of the United 
States. As one author writes of the new policy: " • it was formed 
in part from a half-remorseful reaction against earlier coercive 
policies of the United States. A critic of New Deal policy 
writes: "Where the Caribbean was concerned, Hull's program of economic 
liberalism aimed at achieving trade advantages for the U.S. so as to 
preserve American political and economic domination. 116 While some 
scholars argue the "Good Neighbor" policy stands as a shining example of 
American potential to do the right thing as regards her southern 
neighbors, others hold Roosevelt's administration responsible for the 
harsh conditions of modern Latin America. 7 
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The final change in America's Latin American policy took place 
after the Second World War. After two years of continued emphasis on 
becoming "Good Neighbors," the United States was confronted with a 
perceived threat of Russian designs on the free world. Ev nts in 
postwar Europe caught American policymakers by surprise and led State 
Department analysts to reexamine relations with the nations of Latin 
America. As demonstrated by resolutions proposed by the United States 
at hemispheric conferences at Chap~ltepec, Rfo de Janeiro and Bo got{, 
"the U.S. wanted an orderly hemisphere, loyal to its Cold War policies 
but undemanding of economic assistance."8 
Relations between the United States and tiny Costa Rica follow the 
distinct shifts of America's Latin American policy. At the beginning of 
the century, America's role was that of a benevolent but firm big 
brother. Events within Costa Rica did not affect decision making in 
Washington, as demonstrated by a review of diplomatic communications 
during the first quarter of a century. As one of the region's few 
democracies, the United States was given no reason to involve itself in 
domestic affairs. Ironically, the moralistic Wilsonian non-recognition 
policy found one of its first tests in ostensibly democratic Costa ica. 
This occurred when the United States refused to diplomatically recognize 
h 1917 T . d. h. 9 t e 1noco 1ctators 1p. With the legitimate election of 
Tinoco's successor, Julio Acosta Garcfa in 1920, however, relations were 
1 . d 10 norma 1ze . 
In 1929, the United States intervened diplomatically during a 
dispute over Costa Rica's border with Panama, and helped to defuse 
tensions. 11 The United States closely monitored the domestic strife 
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which briefly erupted after the election of Ricardo Jimenez to his third 
term in 1932. 12 Otherwise, there is no evidence of American interest 
in Costa Rica: when internal conditions flowed smoothly the United 
States remained in the background. 
America's New Deal policymakers were generally satisfied with Costa 
Rica's internal and external affairs. When the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor, Costa Rica became one of the first Latin American nations to 
declare war, preceding even the United 13 States. During the War, 
Washington was grateful for Costa Rica's friendship, as military 
planners formed contingency plans to utilize Costa Rican airfields in 
the event of Axis attacks upon the Panama Canal. 14 The State 
Department was pleased with Costa Rican support for Allied positions and 
tended to look away from the obvious corruption of the Caldercfn Guardia 
administration. 
Robert M. Scotten was appointed Minister to Costa Rica 5 March 1942 
and immediately became involved with domestic politics. In a memorandum 
to then-Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Scotten wrote: 
From what I have been able to learn it appears that 
President Calder6n is faced with a serious although perhaps 
not dangerous political situation due to the somewhat 
precarious financial situation of the Government but also to 
the widespread accusations of graft and mis-management which 
are being directed against him and especially against his 
brother, the Minister of the Interior ••• On the other hand 
President Calder6n has as the Department is well aware, 
cooperated with us to the fullest extent as regards the 
international situation and is I believe a sincere friend of 
the United States. 
I would suggest that this Government be granted 
financial assistance in whatever form and amount the 
Department decides to in order to tide over their immediate 
financial difficulties f~d keep President Calder6n in a 
friendly frame of mind. 
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Wartime considerations were paramount in the decision of the United 
States to provide financial assistance to the Calderon Guardia 
administration. A telegram from Welles to the chairman of the 
Export-Import Bank is illustrative of State Department policy: "The 
Department believes that every possible effort should be made by the 
Export-Import Bank to meet the request of the Government of Costa Rica 
in order assure economic and political stability in that country during 
this crucial period." 16 
Relations between Costa Rica and the United States proceeded 
without incident until 1945. During the war, debt payment on Costa 
Rica's Lend Lease obligations had fallen in arrears but more pressing 
concerns preoccupied the United States. When a reexamination of Costa 
Rica's economic problems was undertaken after the War, the only concern 
of State Department policymakers was to strengthen and reform internal 
fiscal policy. This required the enactment of a more conservative 
economic policy and a degree of belt tightening by the Costa Rican 
government. Demands for additional Export-Import Bank credits to see 
Costa Rica through hard times were "strictly opposed" by the Bank's 
17 
managers. 
In a memorandum written by the Assistant Chief of the Division of 
Caribbean and Central American Affairs of the Department of State, the 
undesirability of the extension of further credit is made clear. 
William P. Cochran's 24 January 1945 note summarizes his opposition to 
further assistance: 
I am opposed to this proposal for the following reasons: 
1. It would be throwing good money after bad .•• Costa 
Rica has no credit and it would be a complete misnomer 
to term any such advance a loan. 
2. It would encourage improvidence. 
3. The influx of further large sums of money in dollar 
exchange would add to the already excess inflation. 
4. There is no certainty that Costa Rica would adopt 
the necessary financial reforms even were the loan 
granted on the basis that it should do so. 
5. The Export-Import Bank would, in my opinion, be 
both unable and unwilling to make such a loan. 
6. I question whether the move would be effective. If 
the object is to maintain a ~Smocratic government in 
power, this is intervention. 
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The record shows Ambassador Johnson concurred with Cochran's 
assessment. In a cable dated 11 April 1945, the ambassador informed 
Washington "that no loan should be made to Costa Rica until the projects 
of law and financial reform have been passed by Congress. ft 19 
Johnson continued by adding "the Costa Rican Congress will have a 
stronger motivation to pass the financial reform laws if another loan 
20 has not been made or promised to Costa Rica before that action." By 
holding back on the extension of additional credit, American officials 
sought to force internal fiscal reforms upon Costa Rica. 
Collateral with the issue of economic assistance was the subject of 
Costa Rica's request for military aid and advisors. Military aid to 
Costa Rica in 1945 was a subject of intense intradepartmental debate. 
In 1947 and 1948 the subject would return to haunt the United States. 
Assistant Secretary of State Nelson A. Rockefeller participated in the 
discussions which concerned military aid and an increase in the size of 
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America's military mission to Costa Rica. Rockefeller appeared to be 
acutely aware of the danger involved in a military buildup in Costa 
Rica, a nation with no external enemies and a unique record of peaceful 
political transaction. On 25 July Rockefeller communicated his concerns 
to Ambassador Johnson: 
The Department is also aware of the facts and traditions of 
Costa Rica's national life, which are identified with civilian 
control of the machinery of Government and minimum intervention 
therein by the military. It consequently feels that it would be 
undesirable to assign United States military officers to perform in 
Costa Rica functions which are normally fulfilled by civilians. 
There would appear to be no advantage to be gained by inaugurating 
in Costa Rica the practice of having military officers handle 
matters outside their direct field and so perhaps build2yp the 
custom of military operation of governmental functions. 
When staff recommendations called for a renewal of arms shipments 
to Costa Rica, Ambassador Johnson protested the decision to Washington. 
Although the staff's decisions "appear to be sound, the political 
conditions in Costa Rica would make it unwise to supply more than the 
minimum military supplies 22 requested." Johnson's principal concern 
was that American weapons might appear on election day to provide 
support for official vote fraud, giving the losers "the opportunity to 
allege that the results of the elections were decided by the potential 
use of guns coming from the United States. " 23 Despite the pleas of 
Johnson and Rockefeller, arms were shipped once again to Costa Rica, 
albeit in smaller amounts that sought by President Picado. The two 
nations signed a limited arms agreement on 10 December 1945 in 
Washington which provided for Costa Rica's pledge to assist in 
hemispheric defense plans and America's promise to protect Costa Rica 
against external aggression. The agreement also called for a four year 
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"Military Mission. for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of 
24 the Repub lie' s army." 
The satisfactory resolution of Costa Rica's requests for economic 
and military assistance in 1945 meant that once again relations with the 
United States were normal. Ambassador Johnson characterized the 
attitude of the Picado government to be "from the beginning one of 
complete 25 cooperation. 11 Opposition complaints about the fraudulent 
1944 presidential election were ignored by the embassy in an honest 
attempt to avoid the appearance of interference in the sovereign affairs 
of another nation. A review of Picado' s first two years in office 
undertaken by Ambassador Johnson 20 February 1946 emphasized the 
president's loyalty to American foreign policy. 26 Of greater interest 
is a telegram from the ambassador to the Secretary of State dated 22 
March 1946, entitled "Attitude of Costa Rica in the Event of Trouble 
between the United States and Russia." After confirming the loyalty of 
Picado's foreign minister, Julio Acosta, Johnson wrote of Picado: " 
his friendship for the United States is so firm that no doubt exists as 
to the position he would take in case of such trouble. The same may be 
said for the other members of the Costa Rican Government. 1127 
Continuing, the ambassador wrote: 
Moreover, the followers of Picado, of the Caldero'n Guardias, 
and of the opposition leaders would back up the Government solidly 
in any position it might take in favor of the United States against 
Russia. The leaders of the opposition are continually inveighing 
against Communism, both in and out of Costa Rica. 
There remains the ex-Communist Vanguardia Popular Party, which 
according to available figures controls some 10 to 15% of those 
entitled to vote in Costa Rica. Manuel Mora, the leader of the 
party, is an opportunist and an admirer of the Soviets. He has, 
however. cooperated with American business interests and has stated 
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to me that he follows no 'line' than the betterment of the laboring 
classes ••• It is true that Trabajo, the weekly paper of 
Vanguardia Popular contains many articles attacking capitalism and 
a few criticizing the United States and its attitude toward Russia, 
but this paper does not necessarily represent the attitude of Mora, 
who after V-J Day organized a large pro-Allied demonstration which 
turned out to be mainly pro-United States. 
In summary, it can be safely said that not only the Government 
but that a great majority of the Costa Rican people would be with 
us as ~ppo28d to Russia in any struggle between the two 
countries. 
Ambassador Johnson cultivated a personal friendship with Mora, whom 
he came to know as a moral and honor ab le native son whose brand of 
Marxism had a distinctly criollo flavor. The memorandum which dealt 
with potential loyalties in the event of a conflict with the Soviet 
Union was the only mention of Communism during 1946. 29 The American 
decisions which involved economic and military aid to Costa Rica never 
considered the Vanguardia Popular party as a threat to American or Costa 
Rican interests, nor was its participation in Costa Rica's government 
an issue. There is little evidence that Cortes virulent anti-communist 
political rhetoric in the controversial 1944 presidential elections was 
considered significant by the American embassy or the State Department. 
The American hesitation to supply weapons or financial assistance was 
based upon strictly pragmatic consideration; Cold War era 
anti-communism did not enter into America's relations with Costa Rica 
until the following year. When Assistant Secretary of State Spruille 
Braden spoke individually with leading Costa Rican politicians 20 May 
1946, his intent was to reduce the hostility between the government and 
its opponents to prevent a repetition of the violence in 1944. Braden 
conveyed to Otilio Ulate, Calderon Guardia and Costa Rican Ambassador to 
the United States, Francisco Guti{rrez, the resolve of the United 
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States to maintain Costa Rica's image as a stable democracy. As Braden 
wrote to Ambassador Johnson: "I expressed the hope that the candidate 
elected to the presidency in 1948 would represent the free choice of the 
30 people." 
There is no mention in Braden's communication of Communism, which 
is unusual, considering his outspoken opposition to Communism both in 
public life and after his 1949 . 31 retirement. The reason for the 
omission was Washington's perception of Mora and the Vanguardia 
Popular party as no threat to American interests. Johnson's appraisal 
of the potential loyalty of Costa Rica's citizens convinced the State 
Department that in the event of any conflict with Russia, the United 
States could count upon Costa Rican support. It was not until 1947 that 
myopic vision dramatically altered America's relations with Costa Rica 
and paranoia replaced rationality. 
The first victim of Washington's new concern was Ambassador 
Johnson, who was rep laced in March 194 7 by Walter J. Donnelly. The 
contrast between the two men helps to illustrate the changing policy of 
the State Department. Johnson, for example, was a personal friend of 
Caldero'n Guardia and Mora and a political liberal. 32 Donnelly was a 
bitter opponent of Communism, whose inaugural press conference in San 
Josi attacked Russia and "discussed Communism as he saw it-a threat to 
all the peoples of America which it was necessary for all governments to 
33 
combat." The departure of Johnson was precipitated by a 9 January 
1947 cable he sent to Braden in Washington. Johnson warned of potential 
chaos in Costa Rica if continued rightwing terrorism succeeded in 
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destabilizing the government, and requested a naval visit by an American 
destroyer to reduce tension. As the ambassador wrote, "I believe the 
mere presence of such a ship in Costa Rican waters would give pause to 
those who are possibly planning to bomb the San Josi water works and 
electric plants, to set fires in the city, and in the confusion take 
over the Government, perhaps by means of assassination of the President 
and his friends. 1134 Johnson feared rightwing opposition violence and 
terrorism and sought to show support for Picado in an effort to avert 
conflict. 
The State Department rejected the ambassador's request for a 
destroyer visit, citing the potential for bad publicity. As Braden 
wrote in his 3 February reply to Johnson, " the consensus here is 
that it would be risky under present conditions and might result in 
allegations of intervention by groups unfriendly to us who are only too 
ready to take advantage of any opportunity to . . . .,35 criticise. 
Washington was caught between a desire to help Costa Rica's government 
by impressing opponents with its support for Picado, and an enhanced 
perception of the threat of Communism, which made any assistance to the 
governing coalition, with Vanguardia Popular participation, difficult if 
not impossible. By the spring of 1947, a conscious decision was made to 
ignore rightwing violence and concentrate on the threat posed by 
Vanguardia Popular, and Ambassador Johnson's return to the United States 
was the first step in the process. 
Domestic strife during the summer of 1947 alarmed the American 
embassy but officials maintained a strictly neutral position in the face 
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of opposition protests. When a group of Ulatistas complained to 
Ambassador Donnelly that American weapons were responsible for injuring 
numerous Costa Rican citizens, the American rejected their charges and 
said: "I wanted to make it perfectly clear to them that this Embassy was 
wholly neutral and that I was confident they would understand our 
. . ,,36 position. Washington's principal concern was for the safety of 
American citizens and the security of American economic interests, and 
preferred to remain indifferent to the opposition's protests. 
During the commercial strike of July, American-owned businesses 
were among those targeted for looting after being opened by police, and 
this prompted a firm reaction from the State Department. In a 
memorandum of a telephone conversation between the Assistant Chief of 
the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs and the embassy in 
San Jos~, America's concern with the influence of Communism on Costa 
Rica's government is apparent. Murray M. Wise wrote of his conversation 
with Charge John Willard Carrigan in San Jose': 
[The Charg~] said that no effort was being made to curb the looters 
and that there had been two or three cases of damage to stores 
owned by U. S. citizens. He said the attitude of police and 
government was that the store owners were getting what they 
deserved ••• He said he could confirm the fact that the police had 
been instructed not to interfere with looters ••• I asked if there 
were any evidences of Communistic activities in the picture. He 
said there definitely were, because the Vanguardia partisans were 
participating in the looting. I asked Mr. Carrigan whether he 
expected this situation to cont~~ue, and he replied that in his 
opinion it would for some time. 
Washington chose to make an informal and verbal protest with a statement 
"that unless American interests were protected from further damage by 
disorderly elements, the Government would have to present a formal 
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written protest. 1138 Modererate elements in the State Department still 
supported loyal American ally Picado, but increased preoccupation with 
Communism began to color relations with Costa Rica. Chargt Carrigan, for 
example, went on record "as very deeply regretting the decision not to 
protest in writing." Among the reasons cited by the chargef "was that 
Vanguardia partisans were now apparently openly participating in the 
disorders. 1139 
President Picado was aware of American concern with Connnunism and 
attempted to make his personal loyalty to the United States a matter of 
public record. In a press release published by the Costa Rican daily La 
Tribuna, Picardo emphasized "the government over which I preside is not 
and never has been Communist, and said the ideology and spirit of this 
country is identified with the United States foreign policy and with the 
democratic doctrines of the bloc of the western nations as generally 
d ,.40 referre to. On 16 September, Picado asked Ambassador Donnelly to 
call on him for the purpose of informing Donnelly 
41 Communism and his loyalty to the United States." 
"of his views of 
A report by Ambassador Donnelly to the Secretary of State, 9 
October, contained an appraisal of the domestic political situation. 
/ After identifying the principals - Calderon Guardia, Ulate and Mora -
the ambassador began his analysis with the role and influence of the 
Vanguardia Popular party: 
Vanguardia follows the Communist line and its leaders are confirmed 
Communists. The present policy of the party is to support the 
candidacy of Calder6n Guardia for President •••• it is logical to 
assume that in supporting Calderon Guardia for President they will 
expect him to reward them with key positions in the Government, the 
Social Security Department, and to endorse their legislative 
agenda. 
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The Vanguardia party has its Secretary-General Dr. Manuel Mora 
who is regarded as the most intelligent of the upper echelon of the 
Costa Rican Communist Party ••• While the party is not conducting 
an open campaign against the United States, it is not friendly to 
the United States ••• 
As regards to the United States, it would be a mistake to 
proceed on any other premise than that Mora is anti-United States, 
anti-United States foreign policy and anti-United States business 
interests. 
Present indications are that Rafael Angel Calder~n Guardia, 
with the support of the Vanguardia party and the Communist leaders, 
will be elected President in February, 1948. While he has openly 
solicited their backing, he tries to allay the fears of 
anti-Communists by saying that he is doing so for political 
expediency and that he 'never has been, is not, and will never be a 
Conrrnunist'. The fact is, however, that he is aligned with them and 
in doing so has contributed to their standing and influence in Costa 
Rica. I2e situation is undeniably tense and anything can 
happen! 
The embassy was aware that the perpetrators of Costa Rica's 
political violence were opposition militants through contacts with the 
American military attache and the public identification of most of the 
opposition terrorists by the daily La Tribuna. 43 Among the documented 
cases of right wing violence between August and December of 1947 are two 
attempts to assassinate Calder6n Guardia, the sabotage of public 
utilities and the bombings of Mora's automobile and the home of La 
Tribuna' s publisher. 44 The record shows that the primary concern of 
the American embassy was not rightist violence, however, but the 
influence of Vanguardia Popular and the potential threat posed to 
American security by the presence of communists in Costa Rica. 
Indicative of the heightened American concern was the recall of 
Ambassador Donnelly, whose gloomy assessment that "anything can happen'' 
dramatized the embassy's lack of control over the deteriorating domestic 
. . 45 
crisis. 
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Donnelly was replaced in November by Nathaniel Davis, a career 
diplomat. The selection of Davis for the troubled San Jos~ assignment 
in interesting, due to the fact that he had been serving in Moscow prior 
to being called to Costa Rica and was dispatched in May 1949 to Hungary. 
As Bell writes, "Among the attentions that Costa Rica received from the 
United States during that period was the assignment of an ambassador 
expert in Communist affairs. 1146 The significance of the assignment of 
Davis to Costa Rica is not lost upon contemporary authors whose 
sympathies lie with Picado, Mora and Calder6n Guardia. Davis is cited 
as proof of America's preoccupation with Communism and opposition to the 
government of Costa Rica. 47 
Concurrent with the appointment of Davis to Costa Rica was an 
increase in the hostile political rhetoric of the opposition press. 
Daily newspaper articles and advertisements drew attention to the issue 
of Communism and the threat it posed to Costa Rica. As Bell writes: 
••• the Diario de Costa Rica, property of the Opposition 
candidate Otilio Ulate, carried on an intense campaign to label 
Caldertn Guardia 'Communist.' There were articles which told Costa 
Rica to take part in the crusade against Marxist 'infiltration' and 
photographs and articles which showed Calder6n Guardia working with 
the vanguardistas in the period of his first administration. A 
political cartoon of April 3, 1947, showed a campesino speaking in 
dialect to a kindly Uncle Sam, rev~Sling to him the truth that 
Costa Rica was in Communist hands. 
Press attacks of this nature plagued President Picado and hindered the 
presidential campaign of Calder6n Guardia. Groups of Costa Ricans in 
the United States mounted a constant publicity blitz which called 
American attention to the threat posed by Vanguardia Popular to the 
Panama 49 Canal. It is not unlikely newly-arrived and staunchly 
anti-communist Ambassador Davis agreed with the propaganda of the 
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opposition whether in fact the opposition believed it or not. As Bell 
writes, "The Cold War gave the distorted elements of the question 
precedence over the rational Somehow, in some mysterious way, the 
Vanguardia Popular purportedly threatened the security of the whole 
hemisphere. 1150 
Ambassador Davis watched the election of February 1948 with great 
interest, and shared the nation's disappointment as the democratic 
process slowly disintegrated. When forces led by the secret po lice 
chief, the Cuban Colonel Tavio, killed Ulate's confidant, Dr. Valverde 
on 1 March, Davis and the diplomatic community assisted in negotiations 
with the government which guaranteed Ulate' s safety and release form 
. · 1 51 J ai • The American ambassador disapproved of President Picado's 
actions, and in a cable dated 3 March wrote the Secretary of State "I 
found it rather disappointing that the President of the Republic should 
take such a negative attitude at this time [since] prevention of 
bloodshed now rests with [him]. 1152 Davis also felt little regard for 
Calderon Guardia, as indicated by his cable of 5 March: 
• Calderon Guardia has in general demonstrated his unfitness 
for the post [of president of Costa Rica] and left little doubt his 
party's obligation to the Vanguardia Popular which is undoubtedly 
effectively accomplishing the purposes g~ its parent organization 
by stirring up dissension and conflict. 
The "parent organization" referred to by the ambassador is, of course, 
International Communism, although contemporary history is devoid of any 
evidence of Russian involvement in Costa Rica's domestic strife. 
Despite evidence of the criollo nature of Connnunism in Costa Rica, the 
officials at the American embassy were out of touch with reality, and 
chose to ignore the simple fact that Vanguardia Popular could not pose 
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any threat to American interests. 54 
When Josi Figueres' rebels attacked an army mobile unit at El 
Empalme, fifty kilometers southwest of the capital near the rugged Cerro 
de la Muerte, it was not a surprise to the embassy. A memorandum 
written by the Vice Consul, Alex A. Cohen provides extensive details 
concerning a revolutionary plot. In addition to the names of 
sympathetic pilots assembled in San Isidro del General who were awaiting 
instructions, Cohen described the strategy and proposed tactics of the 
revolutionaries. Since events turned out just as Cohen predicted, it is 
inconceivable the embassy was taken by surprise. 55 Among the details 
contained in the memorandum was the name of the leader of the 
. J 'F. 56 conspirators, ose igueres. 
Figueres' Costa Rican revolution was born with his exile to Mexico 
by President Calder6n Guardia in 1942. His next six years were spent in 
the search for weapons, finances and recruits. Contacts made with other 
Caribbean exiles in Mexico City proved to be the key to Figueres' 
success. When an exiled Dominican millionaire, Juan Rodrfguez Garc!a, 
enlisted the aid of Caribbean democrats in a plot against Dominican 
dictator Rafael Trujillo, Figueres was contacted. The attempted 
revolution was named after its island staging area, the Cuban Cayo 
Confites. Under international pressure, Cuban President Ramon Grau San 
Mart{n seized the weapons and arrested the mercenaries in September 
1947. Rodrfguez Garc{a prevailed upon liberal Guatemalan President Juan 
Josi Are"valo to arrange for a transfer of the arms from Cuba to 
Guatemala, at which point a variety of exile groups began pleading with 
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Artvalo to convince him of the primacy of their revolutionary designs. 
Nicaraguans, Dominicans, Hondurans, Venezuelans and Figueres' Costa 
Ricans presented their respective cases to Guatemala's president and 
. d h. d . . 57 awaite is ecision. 
After giving consideration to each group's plans, Guatemala's 
president arrived at his decision. A unified revolutionary alliance was 
created, and formalized as the leaders of the different factions signed 
El Pacto del Caribe in Guatemala City, 17 December 1947. With Artvalo's 
blessing, the agreement was dedicated to "derribar las dictaduras 
imper antes y restablecer en ellas la Libertad y la 
Democracia. 1158 When the apparent election fraud occurred in February, 
Figueres' claims of a dictatorship in Costa Rica appeared sincere, and 
Arlvalo prepared for the transfer of arms and the mercenaries of the 
L ./ egion Caribe to Figueres' clandestine airfields. 59 Arevalo was 
motivated not merely by sympathy for the Costa Rican rebels' cause, 
however, but also by his bitter hatred for Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio 
Somoza. Figueres promised Costa Rican support for a future invasion of 
Nicaragua by the Legitn Caribe, after first ridding Costa Rica of the 
"communistic" Calder6n Guardia dictatorship. 60 
Additional research is necessary to determine the extent of 
Washington's knowledge of or participation in the plans of Arevalo, 
Figueres or the Legibn Caribe. A more concrete history of American 
participation in later Caribbean liberal movements is available, and 
shows the support of American intelligence agencies during the 1950' s 
for such regional democrats as Romulo Betancourt, Juan Bosch and 
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Figueres, as democratic alternatives to either communistic or 
h . . d. h. 61 aut oritarian ictators ips. 
In the months preceding Figueres' ambush of government forces on 12 
March 1948, American concern lay in determining the influence and 
importance of Communism in Costa Rica. For example, an 8 January 
~ 
memorandum by Charge Carrigan discussed the communists at length and 
predicted "that the Communist nucleus in Congress may again hold a 
b 1 f · h b d h h C · Ma u 62 a ance o power in t at o y w en t e new ongress meets in y. 
On 10 February Ambassador Davis complained "Vanguardia Popular [is] 
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equally to blame for [the] election problem." And on 13 February 
Davis wrote "Pro-Calder<~n street demonstrations [which have occurred] 
since [the] election [are] described by Calder6n press and radio as 
spontaneous. This is 64 absurd!" Davis attributed much of the blame 
for increased tensions to the Vanguardia Popular. 
Washington shared the sympathies of the embassy in San Jos~. In a 
10 March memorandum, the Director of American Republic Affairs, Paul C. 
Daniels, relates his discussion with Costa Rican Ambassador Gutilrrez 
concerning Communism: 
Mr. Daniels then inquired as to the importance of Connnunism 
in the recent election. Mora told Ambassador Francisco de P. 
Guti~rrez he would side with the U. S. in a conflict between 
Russia and the U. S. "if the latter were right." Ambassador 
GutiE!"'rrez gave the impression that he was trying to indicate 
that Mora and the Vanguardia Popular were not Communistic65 
while he perhaps questioned Mora's real position himself. 
The preoccupation with Communism was apparent at the highest levels of 
the State Department as shown by a telegram from Secretary of State. 
George Marshall to the embassy dated 12 March. Marshall expressed the 
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Department's concern "over recent political trends in Costa Rica and 
[the] possibility of further deterioration into bloodshed which might 
66 develop into armed struggle." The Secretary of State urged Davis to 
make America's feelings known to Picado and explain that the United 
States ". • has long admired Costa Rica's democratic tradition and 
considers it important that it be maintained in this critical world 
period." 67 The "critical world period," an examination of history 
shows, was the commencement of the Cold War. 
Analysis shows the embassy's disapproval of Picado's administration 
and his handling of the political crisis. A memorandum by Vice Consul 
Cohen 12 March repeats the 3 March assessment of Picado made by 
Ambassador Davis. Cohen wrote, "The situation of President Picado in 
the picture has not been a happy or attractive one. Ever since the 
elections, he has failed to exert himself as Chief Executive to such an 
extent that he is being looked upon today with pity more than anything 
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else." The First Secretary of the embassy, Andrew J. Donovan III, 
conveyed his impressions of the political situation in a memorandum on 
12 March: 
••• the administration as such has shown its extreme 
weakness and, at least to a certain measure, control of the 
police~ower of the country has undoubtedly been taken over by 
Calderon Guardia and his Vanguardia Popular supporters. 
It is believed that they constitute perhaps the most 
important single factor in the situation and may profit from 
this g§sition to obtain further advantages not now apparent 
A comparison of the thoughts of Ambassador Davis, Vice Consul Cohen and 
First Secretary Donovan shows the extent of the consensus at the 
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embassy. Any political scheme which involved a return of Calderon 
Guardia to the presidency would perforce increase the influence and 
power of Vanguardia Popular and open the door for a possible Russian 
influence in America's hemisphere. The dilemma which the United States 
faced was to avoid a solution which would lead to a dict&torship of the 
left, while preserving Costa Rica's democratic tradition. The answer to 
/ America's problem appeared in the form of Jose Figueres. 
After one week of fighting, embassy officials had come to certain 
conclusions about the chances of a Figueres victory. Vice Consul 
Cohen's memorandum reflects the political officer's intelligence 
analysis: 
••• Since the final solution of the political problem now is 
dependent, to a considerable extent, upon that of the military 
one, it would not appear far-fetched to assert that the key to 
any final solution now may well depend on the extent of purely 
m~litary 7 flid which both sides may be able to secure from 
without. 
Since victory would be afforded the side which could procure outside 
aid, the United States sought to internalize the conflict. Washington 
intervened against Nicaragua and Guatemala to prevent them from 
assisting their allies in Costa Rica. The fear of open warfare in 
Central America added to the urgency with which the United States acted. 
As mentioned earlier, Guatemalan President Ar~valo supported 
Figueres. Cargo flights between his nation and Costa Rica carried 
weapons and mercenaries of h L 
. , 
t e egion Cari be to begin Figueres' 
revolution. Arevalo' s enemy, "Tacho" Somoza of Nicaragua, aided the 
Costa Rican government of President Picado. Somoza's support was based 
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upon his fear of Are'valo and the Legibn Caribe, and his friendship with 
former President Calderon Guardia. Time magazine explained Nicaraguan 
aid to Costa Rica as the result of a lucrative and illegal cattle trade 
business operated as a partnership between Somoza and Caldertn 
G d . 71 uar ia. In response to the outside aid to the parties fighting 
within Costa Rica, Washington demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
Nicaraguan and Guatemalan aid. In a telegram 19 March the American 
ambassador in Guatemala was told to "seek an early interview with 
President Are'"valo, to convey the deep concern of the United States." 72 
Identical instructions were sent to the American Charge' in Managua, 
73 Bernbaum. The Charge was instructed to "inform Somoza unofficially 
[of] our deep concern over intervention of any foreign government in 
Costa Rican internal affairs. 1174 
The response to American pressure came literally overnight. 
Arevalo promised American Ambassador Kyle in Guatemala "his government's 
policy was that of neutrality and nonintervention," and assured the 
United States aid to Figueres would 75 cease. Senor Sevilla Sacasa, 
the Nicaraguan representative in Washington, spoke for Somoza when he 
stated "in view of the position of the United States Government, which 
has been brought informally to my attention, Nicaragua would follow a 
'hands off' policy, despite the official request of President 
Picado." 76 By the time of the promises made by Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, the latter's aid to Figueres was nearly complete; at least 
fifteen clandestine DC-3 flights had brought weapons and supplies to 
C R . 77 osta ica. When Nicaragua withdrew its aid to Calder6n Guardia and 
Picado, the parity between the opposing sides in Costa Rica no longer 
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existed, the tactical superiority having gone to the rebels. The United 
States' diplomatic intervention which forced the withdrawal of 
Nicaraguan and Guatemalan aid swung the military balance in Figueres' 
favor, regardless of the apparent benevolence of the American action. 
Other American actions were more obviously biased toward helping 
Figueres, as the record shows. Before hostilities broke out on 12 
March, Figueres' rebels stored weapons at highway construction 
facilities run by the United States at Villa Mills (Millsville) 
/ 
southwest of San Jose. Acting with covert American support, the rebels 
used the storage depot to accumulate material just a few kilometers from 
Figueres' 78 farm. I After fighting began, American military attache Lt. 
Colonel James R. Hughes and his Costa Rican aide, Jorge Woodbridge, 
passed through government lines under a flag of truce on 
purportedly-diplomatic missions to rebel encampments. In reality, the 
American utilized the opportunity to make reports to rebel leaders 
concerning government positions and troop deployment. This critical 
covert assistance in the initial stages of the Civil War proved 
invaluable in the capture of San Isidro del General and enabled th 
rebels to gain momentum. As the Costa Rican rebel military strategist, 
Colonel Frank Marshall Steinvorth confessed, "the help provided by the 
military attache prevented a quick victory by government forces." 79 
Additional evidence of overt American assistance to the rebels has been 
difficult to discover, despite the conviction of the Calderonistas that 
h 0 d 0 d d F. 80 sue ai was provi e to igueres. A cryptic telegram from American 
Ambassador Hall in Panama to the State Department dated 29 February 1948 
may suggest some American involvement in aid to Figueres. Hall wrote: 
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[The] Costa Rican Ambassador and [his] son had interviews with 
[General] Crittenberger [Commander in Chief, Southern Command] ••• 
They told [him] that they had news of arms smuggling from David 
[Panama] to Costa Rica in which [an] U.S. Army Sgt. was involved • 
• • Crittenberger replied very correctly ••• that since U.S. 
troops had been withdrawn to the Canal Zone what happened8fn other parts of Panamanian territory was not our direct concern. 
While the existence of an American military effort to covertly 
assist Figueres from Panama has not yet been documented, Ambassador 
Hall's description of General Crittenberger ingenuous reply presents a 
number of questions. While the participation of an American citizen in 
activities designed to help rebels overthrow the Costa Rican government 
may technically be beyond the purview of the United States as a matter 
of international law, the similar participation of a member of the armed 
forces certainly would fall within Crittenberger's jurisdiction. The 
telegram raises more problems than it resolves. 
When Nicaraguan aid was withdrawn from the beleaguered Picado 
government, the United States knew that without outside help the rebels 
would prevail. A confidential memorandum written by military attache 
Hughes 30 March for the State Department contained his assessment of the 
situation, which included a lengthy analysis of Vanguardia Popular. 
Hughes took the position that the only result of a Calderon Guardia 
victory would be enhanced prestige for h . 82 t e communists. On 1 April 
Vice Consul Cohen wrote a memorandum which detailed the growth of 
the Vanguardia Pop;ilar and concurred with the military attache that 
chief beneficiaries of a government victory would be Mora and the 
. 83 
communists. 
The State Department had come to the same conclusions concerning 
the results of a victory by the government. A memorandum written by 
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William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central American and 
Panama Affairs, summarizes the information received from the embassy 
concerning Vanguardia Popular. The 26 March analysis stated: 
Communism in Costa Rica, operating under the name of 
Vanguardia Popular since the 1943 Comintern dissolution, today 
occupies a position of importance far out of proportion to its 
numerical strength. With an estimated 7,000 militant members, 
representing less than 1 percent of the total population of the 
country, Vanguardia was successful during the recent political 
campaign in increasing its representation in Costa Rica's 
unicameral Congress to at least 6 and possibly 8 seats out of a 
total of 54. Since the other two parties are evenly matched with 
about 23 seats each, the communists have thus been successful in 
obtaining an effective balance of power in the Congress. 
Vanguardia's influence on the National Republican 
[administration] party in paramount. It constitutes the bulk of 
the Government's support today. The Embassy describes Vanguardia 
as being both directly and indirectly responsible for the present 
state of chaos and uncertainty in Costa Rica. • • 
The Embassy states that the situation of uncertainty and 
insecurity which now exists in Costa Rica is in many respects 
similar to that prevailing today in Eastern Europe. While this 
estimate may be a bit overdrawn, it is perhaps worthwhile to recall 
that Haya de la Torre of Peru, in a recent statement to United 
Press, descr~~ed Costa Rica as the 'Czechoslovakia of the Western 
Hemisphere.' 
The issue of CollID.lunism was critical enough to prompt Bennett to call in 
Costa Rican Ambassador Gutie"rrez 30 March to discuss the question of 
communist influence in the Ambassador's country. 85 
The United States knew that by preventing the Picado government 
from receiving outside help or gaining access to military supplies it 
was inevitable the rebels would prevail. 
~ Ambassador Gutierrez received 
a harsh introduction to America's plans on 19 March, when he met with 
Paul C. Daniels, Director of American Republic Affairs, and Robert 
Newbegin, Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs. 
After complaining to the Americans about evidence of Guatemalan aid to 
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Figueres, Guti~rrez "defended with some heat the action of the 
Nicaraguan Government. He pointed out that under the Habana 
Convention Guatemala was obliged not to assist the opposition group, 
while the same Convention permitted aid to a legitimate government. 1186 
Newbegin continued: 
Ambassador Guti~rrez then inquired what the position of the 
U.S. would be if the Costa Rican government asked us for military 
support. Mr. Daniels parried this question as being hypothetical 
and expre§7ed the hope that he would not be given any more 
problems. 
American actions to prevent Costa Rica's government from securing arms 
went beyond Daniels' curt response to Ambassador Gutierrez. In fact, 
every diplomatic and private action of the United States was designed to 
deny the weapons Costa Rica so desperately needed to defeat Figueres' 
rebels. 
Since he was denied access to American military channels, President 
Picado sought to deal directly with the Thompson machinegun factory to 
purchase weapons. American officials in Washington intervened, however, 
and refused to grant required export permits, forcing the cancellation 
of the sale. Picado's questions about the American denial went 
d b ff . . 1 88 unanswere y government o 1c1a s. In another instance of direct 
American action to prevent arms from reaching Costa Rica's government, a 
shipment of arms purchased in Mexico was seized by Mexican security 
officials who had acted on a tip from the American embassy. 
Ambassador Gutie'rrez confronted Newbegin in Washington and demanded 
an explanation for the American action. President Picado, Gutierrez 
complained, "was broken hearted because of actions undertaken by the 
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United States which prevented him from obtaining arms for his 
89 government." In direct response, Newbegin informed Gutie'rrez that 
on no occasion "had this government specifically requested any other 
American government to refrain from supplying arms to Costa Rica . ., 9o 
Newbegin lied to the Costa Rican, according to American records 
~ Through covert informants in San Jose, the American embassy learned that 
Ministro de Seguridad Rene Picado had arranged to purchase arms in 
Mexico, and notified Ambassador Walter Thurston in Mexico City. Mexican 
security forces were advised and the shipment was seized just prior to 
k / 91 ta eoff for San Jose. 
American efforts to prevent other nations from responding to 
Picado's request for help proved successful. Aid which had be n 
tentatively promised the Costa Rican government by sister states in 
Latin America was never forthcoming, probably as a result of American 
pressure. A circular telegram from Secretary of State Marshall to 
American embassies in the region put everyone on notice of Washington's 
"deep concern over intervention by any foreign government in Costa Rican 
internal affairs and our feeling that such intervention is particularly 
regrettable on [the] eve [of the] / "92 Bogota Conference. On 5 April 
Costa Rica's Foreign Minister, "speaking in [the] name of President 
Picado expressed bewilderment at [the] U.S. attitude which inexplicably 
appears [to be] unfriendly to [the] government [of] Costa R . .,93 ica. 
After once again stating Costa Rican loyalty lay with American 
interests, the Minister listed incidents of Costa Rican support for t e 
United States and the State Department during the War. "When [the] 
government which did [the] U.S. this favor now desperately needs arms, 
96 
[it] finds [that the] U.S. blocks [Costa Rica's] efforts at ev ry 
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turn." The conclusion reached by Ambassador Davis was as follows: 
"[I] believe [the] foregoing points to [a] realization by [the] 
government [of Costa Rica that the] situation [is] desperate unless 
outside supplies [of weapons are made] available. 1195 Davis confirmed 
the serious situation which the government faced if they were unable to 
procure weapons. The effect of continued denials of support by the 
United States ensured the defeat of Costa Rica's army and its allies, 
the fighting mariachis of the Vanguardia Popular. 96 
Additional insight into the American position is revealed by a 
memorandum written 22 March by Ambassador Davis, entitled "Some Thoughts 
on the Political Situation:" 
In the foregoing comments I have not touched on the question of 
where the United States interests lie. Obviously, the most 
desirable solution from our point of view would by a constitutional 
succession acceptable to a majority of the people and involving the 
elimination of communist influence in or on the government and 
suppression of all private political armies. The election of Ulate 
was a step toward this goal, soon obliterated by the annulment of 
that election. To seat him by force of arms also would serve our 
interests to a point although the resort to extra-constitutional 
means would more than over balance the desirable effects--both 
within Costa Rica and abroad--of such action. On the other hand, a 
government military victory, if followed by the selection of a 
First Designate unacceptable to the opposition--Dr. Caldera'n 
Guardia would be an extreme case--probably would tend toward a 
~trengthen~~g of communist influence which would not be in our 
interests. 
The best solution is Davis' mind was one which eliminated the 
communists from Costa Rica, and the most efficacious method for doing so 
was the denial of military assistance to Picado's government. 
While the State Department prevented outside help from reaching 
Picado, Ambassador Davis applied pressure in San Josg. The ambassador 
97 
,,,,, 
pressed Picado to resign and urged him to exile Calderon Guardia and 
Mora to relieve tensions. The anti-communist political propaganda which 
appeared daily in opposition media, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, was joined by the international press. Correspondents from 
American newspapers, such as The New York Times, adopted the rhetoric 
and distortions which the domestic media carried. 98 A few examples 
are illustrative: 
22 March It is believed that the Picado's now realize that 
they have created a Frankenstein monster in 
accepting the support of the Communists • • • No 
Communists are at the front, all, including the 
shock troops, are in the capital; 
23 March Communist strategy appears to be to allow the 
Figueres rebels and government troops to exhaust 
each other before moving in and taking over, 
meanwhile strutting around San Jose, armed to the 
teeth; 
24 March Twenty seven men and women of the Costa Rican League 
Against Communist Domination picketed yesterday the 
Russian Consulate ••• 'The Communist coup in Costa 
Rica,' Senor Facio said, 'is the first Russian 
invasion of the American continent and is in reality 
preparation for gaining Red control of the Panama 
Canal;' 
31 March The Costa Rican Communists, meanwhile, are believed 
to be gathering their strength, convinced that they 
will come out on top after the Government and the 
rebels have exhausted one another; 
7 April Armed bands are now looting and killing defenseless 
£armers and anyone suspected of belonging to the 
opposition. Several persons were dragged from their 
homes and shot. That a few were beheaded has been 
established; 
15 April Costa Rica's Civil War appears to have reached a 
point where the Picado Government has virtually 
eliminated and Manuel Mora, leader of the 
communistic Popular Vanguard party is fighting to 
keep Col. Jose'Figueres out of the capital; 
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18 April Communist Popular Vanguard troops have knocked out 
the teeth and bloodied the face of Gen. Ren~Picado • 
• • If true, it shows there is a break between the 
Vanguard and the Government, and that the former is 
in control; 
19 April Meanwhile, it was reported Vanguardia troops were 
making wholesale arrests and were looting and 
burning houses in San Jose; and, 
21 April All armed forces under the control of the Picado / 
Government have been ordered to surrender to Jose 
Figueres, a civilian who outfought and outwitted 
Government forces with his guerillas despite the 
fact that the regime's troops were better armed and 
equipped_and9~ere aided by Nicaraguan and other 
mercenaries. 
Without exception, every statement above and many others like them were 
devoid of factual basis. lOO This discrepancy raises the question: 
What was the source for so much misinformation? A possible answer is 
found a in memorandum entitled "Comment on Press Coverage of Political 
Crisis in Costa Rica," written by the Public Affairs Officer at the 
American embassy in San Jose. Albert E. Carter's 9 March dispatch to 
the Secretary of State was a response to Picado administration 
criticisms of American journalism. After listing several of the 
accredited journalists to Costa Rica and commenting favorable upon their 
work product, Carter wrote: 
All of the correspondents mentioned have kept in close touch 
with the Embassy and have been helpful to the Embassy in its 
observance of developments. At the same time, the Embassy has done 
what it could to facilitate the work of the correspondents in order 
that they might present as true a 181cture of developments as possible for the American public. 
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Given the difficulty involved in travel to the front in a guerrilla 
war such as Costa Rica's and the prevalent anti-communism of embassy 
officials it is not hard to imagine that much of the misinformation 
contained in the contemporary news reports began at the American 
102 
embassy. 
The effect of the constant anti-communist news articles was to 
increased pressure upon Picado to resign. Another, more sinister factor 
which turned public support against the government was the rumor of an 
American military intervention to aid Figueres. Despite protests of 
denial from the embassy, the rumors persisted, as did those of an 
imminent Vanguardia Popular takeover (as reported in the press). 
Secretary of State Marshall contributed to the tension with a statement 
made during the BogotaConference. As Ameringer writes: II U.S. 
Secretary of State George Marshall, in reference to the Bogotazo and the 
events in Costa Rica, declared his intention to protect both flanks of 
103 the Panama Canal from a Communist takeover." Bell writes that 
"Picado received information that a United States force had been 
organized in the Canal Zone [to] end the hostilities now that the 
combatants had been clearly identified as Connnunists and seemed to b in 
control of San Jose. 11104 Ambassador Davis, despite continuous 
denials, was responsible for military preparations in the Canal Zone to 
send aircraft to Costa Rica for the purpose of an evacuation of 
President Picado and his party. A document prepared by the office of 
the Commander in Chief of the Southern Military Command stated: 
Ambassador Davis of Costa Rica is requesting this Headquarters to 
arrange the necessary aircraft to stand by in the Canal Zone for 
the evacuation of President Picado and [his] rB5ourage. • • and 
further recommends a fighter aircraft escort. 
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One of the reasons for Davis' request for a fighter escort was 
elementary. Davis knew Costa Rica's airport at La Sabana was held by 
Vanguardia Popular partisans, and without an agreement with CalderO'n 
Guardia or Mora these troops might impede the departure of Picado. 106 
The military intervention by American forces was made unnecessary by 
events within Costa Rica, however, as Ambassador Davis pressed Picado 
for a truce. 
Negotiations were conducted with the government and representatives 
of Figueres present, and were presided over by Davis and the Papal 
Nuncio, Monsenor Cent oz, with the help of the diplomatic community. 
Excellent summaries of the American ambassador's role may be found in 
Davis' personal diary, which gives a daily breakdown of the negotiating 
process from 11 April to 20 April 1948. Ambassador Davis made ten round 
trips between San Josrf and the enemy positions near Cartage, each time 
crossing between government and rebel lines without incident. During 
the peace negotiations, a threat arose to once again expand the conflict 
beyond Costa Rica's national boundaries. General Somoza of Nicaragua 
entered into a secret agreement with Calderon Guardia and Picado during 
a hurried reunion in Puntarenas. The Costa Ricans agreed to the terms 
of a military assistance plan formulated by Somoza and Francisco 
Calderon in Managua, in which Nicaragua would provide troops and weapons 
for the capture of Guanacaste province in northern Costa Rica. 
~ 
President Picado and Calderon Guardia would withdraw from San Jose and 
establish their capital in from whence a unified 
Nicaraguan/Costa Rican force would launch an assault on the Figueres 
107 forces. 
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The desperation alliance between Picado and Somoza fell apart when 
the American charge' in Managua learned the details of the accord and 
advised Ambassador Davis in San Jos~. The ambassador made the agreement 
between Nicaragua and the Costa Rican government known to the diplomatic 
community and used his secret knowledge of the pact to bring about 
Picado's resignation. In a 21 April memorandum entitled "Mediation of 
the Costa Rican Revolt," Davis reveals that his diplomatic colleagues 
"agreed to say nothing about the matter until the entire group was 
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assembled." When Mora, Calder6n Guardia and President Picado were 
present, the ambassador sprung his trap: 
I then asked the Mexican Ambassador to read that portion of Mr. 
Bernbaum's telegram consisting of verbatim quotations of General 
Somoza's note. When my colleague read the statement that 
Nicaraguan troops were already in Costa Rica at the request of the 
Government, Manuel Mora started violently. Because I knew Dr. 
Calderon at least and probably the President were aware of the 
activities of Mr. Francisco Calderon in Managua, I watched them 
particularly, Dr. Calderon exhibited no sign whatsoever of emotion; 
the President flushed deeply. After a pause during which all 
present maintained a dead silence, I stated that this information 
changed completely the complexion of the local problem ••• All of 
the American Republics would take a most serious view of the 
invasion of one American country by another. Without even having 
time to consult our governments we could state with certainty t at 
none of the American Governments would permit such a breach of 
peace and that they would know how to punish those responsible for 
it. 
As described in detail in the enclosed extract from my diary 
of April 18, a somewhat angry scene ensued and the President 
attempted to evade a direct reply to our question as to whether or 
not Somoza's statements were true that: (a) his troops were 
already in the country; and, (b) that they were there at the 
request of the government of Costa Rica. The President suddenly 
arose and stalked from the room saying he would have to consult. 
The Mexican Ambassador told me subsequently that when he followed 
him into the hall ty09President put his arms around him and said 
'save me, save me.' 
Davis' harsh threat was unmistakable to Picado, who signed a formal 
treaty of peace the next day. President Picado and his entourage fled 
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to exile in Nicaragua immediately upon signing the document, but the 
pitiable specter of the cornered president certainly leaves little doubt 
as to the ability of the United States to influence events in tiny Costa 
R . llO ica. 
Jose Figueres' triumphant entry into San Jose occurred April 24. 
Leading a jubilant army of thousands, Figueres marked the end of th 
Calder6n Era and the begining of the Second Republic. By late May 
. "' Figueres had substituted himself for Provisional President Santos Leon 
Herrera and proclaimed a ruling Junta, invoking emergency powers and 
suspending the Constitution. The Civil War had ended. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The most significant result of the American intervention to 
eliminate the communist influence in Costa Rica was the restoration and 
institutionalization of democracy in the small Central American nation. 
The process did not occur overnight, however, but was the result of 
months of factionalism and discord which followed the 1948 Civil War. 
The principal short term beneficiary of the United States; policy was 
rebel leader Jose' Figueres, but the long term result contributed to 
Costa Rica uniqueness. 
Figueres entered into a pact with Otilio Ulate which called for 
eighteen months of Junta rule, to be followed by Ulate's appointment as 
president. A broad spectrum of the nation's leading citizens was 
offered Junta membership in an honest effort to forge an impartial 
coalition. Despite a dedication to prevent retribution against the 
vanquished Calderonistas and communists, errors were committed in the 
early stages of Junta rule. A number of former officials were the 
victims of Junta punishment and incarcerations, but the greatest mistake 
was the alienation of one of the Junta's initial supporters, Costa 
Rica's small but influential oligarchy. Laws which imposed a ten 
percent income tax and nationalized the banking system were anathema to 
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conservatives, who quickly made their opposition 1 known. 
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A decline 
in popular support was occasioned by a campaign of pub lie criticism 
mounted by the opposition controlled mass media. 
The international image of Costa Rica was tarnished by the 
continued presence of Legibn Caribe mercenaries within the 2 country. 
The promised assault upon Somoza's dictatorship in Nicaragua was a 
poorly kept secret, and Figueres' adherence to his promise to Arevalo 
and the Pacto del Caribe prompted foreign criticism. Figueres was a man 
of honor and principle, to the point of obstinance, and refused to bow 
to international pressure until the matter was taken out of his hands by 
the end of 1948. In October, dissent within the exile's ranks led to a 
split between the Nicaraguan Argilello and the Dominican, Rodr{guez. T e 
latter departed with the bulk of the fighters to attempt yet another 
assault upon Trujillo, while Argilello's small group remained behind to 
complete its unfinished business with Somoza. 3 
A force of Calderonistas and Nicaraguan soldiers invaded Costa Rica 
in December and attempted the overthrow of the Junta. General Somoza of 
Nicaragua had waited to launch his attack until Rodr!guez' fighters 
departed for Guatemala and the mercenary force was reduced. Junta 
President Figueres refused to launch a counterattack, as urged by 
thousands of Costa Rican volunteers, but rather sought a diplomatic 
solution via the untested pacification provisions of the Charter of the 
Organization of American States. This was the first indication of the 
internationalist facet of Jos~ Figueres' personality which became his 
4 trademark. 
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On Christmas Eve, 1948, the report of the Organization of American 
States fact-finding commission was issued, and it condemned both nations 
for their respective support of exile groups intent upon the attack and 
subversion of a sister republic. "The Council asked both countries to 
refrain from hostile acts, and promised to maintain an observer force 
along the border to ensure continued peace between the two nations. "S 
Among the conditions demanded of Figueres and Costa Rica was the 
unconditional eviction of the fragmented Legio'n Caribe, to which 
Figueres reluctantly agreed. By February 1949, Organization of American 
States observers were satisfied by Figueres prompt action and certified 
6 Costa Rica as being in compliance with the demands placed upon her. 
Two weeks prior to the abortive Nicaraguan invasion, elections were 
held to choose representatives for Costa Rica's constituent assembly. 
One aspect of the campaigning for seats was the appearance of a split in 
the ranks of the formerly unified Junta. Disappointment with the lack of 
progress towards democratization and, perhaps most importantly, 
personality conflicts led Otilia Ulate to publicly break with Figueres. 
Ulate' s Partido Union Nacional overwhelmed Figueres' Partido Social 
Demdcrata in the voting, primarily because of Figueres' fatal political 
"naivete, by which he tried to place himself above politics, believing 
7 
that honest work would be rewarded with popular support." 
While his opponents, which now included Ulatistas as well as 
Calderonistas, maintained a constant attack upon the activities of 
Figueres and the Junta, the president placed himself above the 
degradation of a political campaign. One result of Figueres' tactics 
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was the opposition's attainment of a legislative maj ori t y capable of 
blocking the passage of any Junta measures. An example of t he power of 
the opposition is found in the final version of t he 1949 Constitution . 
This and other Junta projects were de f eated or r e duced in effect by the 
Asemblea Legislativa, whose principal objective wa s a r eduction of the 
economic and social pressure upon Costa Rica 's sma l l oligarchy . 8 
During the summer of 1949, the Junta was p lagu ed with a series of 
crises; as soon as one problem was resolved another would arise . The 
most serious problem faced by the Junta was a commun i s t-inspired labor 
conflict which began in the Quepos banana planta t ion s . President 
Figueres flew into the strike zone to reduce tens ions , and offered the 
workers a "settlement formula" which conceded mos t of the striker's 
9 demands. The visit to the banana region, and t h e int ransigence of 
the giant United Fruit Company in the f ace of nat i onali st i c support for 
the workers' position, convinced Figueres that relations be t ween Costa 
Rica and the company required adjustment. Figue r es ' perception of 
national sovereignty . ' . vis-a-vis foreign corpora t i ons reflected his 
liberal and progressive political ph ilosophy . His principal 
consideration was that any relationship mu s t exhib it fairness for all 
parties, not just the wealthy foreign cor porat i ons. In later years, 
Figueres' theme, the necessity for a fa i r and equitable interchange 
between producer and consumer, was repeated in a variety of 
international forums. 
The one-sidedness of the rela tionship b etween the United Fruit 
Company and Costa Rica bothered Pres i den t Figueres, who recognized the 
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potential for conflict between the nation's classes over the issue of 
foreign corporations. The possibility of an economic crisis, arising 
out of another labor conflict, could only serve to benefit the disgraced 
Communist Party. Therefore, Figures sought to stave off revolutionary 
and nationalistic impulses through the enactment of reform legislation. 
The principal Junta reforms were contained in the 1949 Constitution. 
The Junta Constitution attempted to give permanence to Costa Rica's 
existent social legislation, the Garantfas Sociales of Calderon 
Guardia's administration. In addition, the principle of public 
regulation of private property and enterprise was established and 
"empowered the state to direct and stimulate production • .. 10 The 
primary goal 
distribution 
of the Junta, as stated, 
of wealth possible." 11 
was "to ensure the widest 
Despite opposition from 
conservatives and the Church, the Junta was able to create autonomous 
government organizations to administer social welfare programs which 
were outside the control or administration of the Executive; Figueres 
was determined to prevent any change in Costa Rica's social welfare 
programs by future conservative presidents. In addition, women were 
given the right to vote, which was considered progressive for Latin 
America in 1949. 12 The final Constitution was declared effective 7 
November 1949, and Otilia Ulate assumed the office of president as 
planned. 
Ulate soon found himself burdened by a hostile Congress, as had the 
Junta before him. While Ulate spent the next four years in attempts at 
compromise and reconciliation, Figueres became an international 
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traveler. In a series of trips abroad, private citizen Figueres spoke 
with candor to groups of receptive audiences. In May 1950, he 
established his reputation as a leader of the Democratic Left at a 
conference of democratic leaders in Havana. 13 No longer preoccupied 
with domestic turmoil, Figueres spoke out in favor of forceful American 
leadership in the region. He "criticized United States policy, but in 
the spirit of a reformer who foresaw the great good it could do if it 
would side with Latin America's liberals. 1114 
The only solution to the threat of Communism was "the development 
of Latin America. 1115 Not traditional development, with the foreign 
investor dictating to the host nation, but rather "economic 
independence" for Latin America. "He insisted that maintaining low 
wages to keep the prices of Latin American products low for North 
American consumers was one of the most serious barriers to hemispheric 
unity." 16 If better prices were paid for third world products, 
Figueres concluded, the United States could refrain from giving foreign 
aid, which belittles the recipient and discourages self help. 
As Ameringer writes: 
Don Pepe was ahead of his time in advancing the notion that 
foreign aid was unnecessary if the industrialized nations would pay 
better prices for the agricultural products of the less developed 
countries • • • the best economic af 1 Latin America could receive 
was adequate payment for its labor. 
Two further examples illustrate Figueres' vision of the ideal 
relationship between the United States and Latin America. In July 1951, 
in a speech at the Stanford University Conference on Latin America, 
Figueres said, "With a fair price for its products Latin America could 
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undertake its 18 own development." Citing his own example of Costa 
Rica, he urged American support for the creation of autonomous 
institutions in the various nations. He termed it "a mistake • . • to 
turn private enterprise loose in our feudalistic economy, and 
recommended instead aid to state owned 19 enterprise." On February 
1952, in what was termed the "most dynamic" speech of the day, a 
captivated twenty-fifth annual Rollins College Animated Magazin 
audience heard "a clarion call for moral leadership from the United 
States of America. 1120 The address given by Figueres was entitled 
"What We Want From the U.S.," and began by thanking the United States 
for its "technical assistance." He continued: 
More than that, we want something of the spirit. Communism 
stands definitely and strongly for something, our Latin American 
dictatorships, which happily for the people are crumbling, stand 
for something; we want the United States to stand for something 
equally strongly and definitely, and something that it practices in 
its relations with us. 
We appreciate the spirit behind the Point Four program, but 
more than that we would appreciate a fair price for our products 
and raw materials in free exchange between our nations. That 
enables us to help ourselves. 
Your housecleaning of whatever degree of graft and corruption 
there ~i be in your government is setting an example for us to 
follow. 
Figueres travelled widely during Ulate's presidency as he sought to 
bring about positive changes in Latin America, the most important being 
Washington's perception of its neighbors. Within Costa Rica, Figueres' 
Partido Social DemO'crata partisans sought to translate their party 
chief's internationalist progressivism into domestic results. The 
disastrous political defeat at the polls in 1949 convinced party leaders 
of the necessity to campaign aggressively, despite Figueres' disdain for 
such activities. 
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The veterans of the rebel victory in 1948 had called themselves the 
Army of National Liberation during and after the conflict, which led the 
Partido Social Dem6crata to change its name to Partido Liberacion 
Nacional to increase public recognition and support. The Fundamental 
Charter of the new party was signed at the ranch of Francisco Orlich on 
October 1951 and marked the beginning of institutionalized democracy in 
Costa Rica. Although the party supported Figueres for president in 
1954, it went beyond stereotypical Latin American personalismo and 
represented the introduction of party politics to Costa Rica. 22 As 
Ameringer writes: 
Thus although Don Pepe was the dominant personality, the principal 
founders of the PLN did not idolize him as infallible or 
indispensible~ In their minds they did not create a vehicle for 
electing Jose-'Figueres president of Costa Rica: they or23nized a 
political party with a permanent structure and ideology. 
Figueres' popularity as the hero of the Civil War provided Partido 
Liberaci6n Nacional with the vehicle to elective off ice and the 
opportunity to change Costa Rica's social and economic structure. When 
Figueres campaigned for president in 1953, "he appealed to a wide 
stratum of the population. His personal charisma cut across class, 
occupational and business lines. Also, lack of a well-defined opposition 
that year helped insure the randomness of his 
24 
support." Figueres 
, 
won a landslide victory over Partido Democrata candidate Fernando Castro 
Cervantes which established Partido Liberaci6n Nacional as the dominant 
f R 1 . . 25 orce in Costa ican po itics. 
As Ameringer writes in his latest work, Democracy in Costa Rica: 
The PLN was the first political party worthy of the name in 
Costa Rican history. It had a defined political program, with a 
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permanent organization and structure that gave it a life of its 
own. The party embraced representative democracy and called for 
the broadest possible action of government, in order to provide for 
social justice and economic opportunity, without excluding the 
right of private property. It followed the concepts of a mixed 
economy and multi-class society, although it gave priority to the 
authori~i of the state in seeking the greatest good for the greatest 
number. 
As an example of the permanence of Partido Liberaci6n Nacional and 
its profound effect upon Costa Rican society, Ameringer cites the fact 
" ••• the welfare state the PLN created was not dismantled during 
the times that its leaders did not occupy the president's chair .• 
In fact, from the time that Figueres was first elected president 
in 1953 until the present, 29n only one occasion (1974) did the PLN 
succeed itself in office." 
In his excellent analysis of the origins and importance of Partido 
Liberaci~n Nacional, Burt H. English of the University of Florida 
writes: 
By 1951, the year the National Liberation Party was founded, 
the precedents for a fairly coherent and inclusive political and 
economic program had been established. Those precedents drew upon 
a variety of sources including the revisionist doctrines of 
European socialism and the domestic oriented approach of the Latin 
American Apristas, tempered by the pragmatism of the New Deal and 
twentieth-century regulatory liberalism. The democratic process 
was emphasized above all, and a higher standard of livin~8was deemed most important in order to make the process work. 
With the establishment of Partido Liberaci~n Nacional in Costa 
Rica, the era of personalist politics was brought to a close. The irst 
western-style political party in Costa Rica ensured that democracy would 
be the basis for national political, economic and social life. The 
abolition of Costa Rica's army by Junta President Figueres in 1948 
contributed to domestic tranquility as well. With a viable and 
permanent party such as Partido Liberaci6n Nacional, the country became 
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assured of a loyal opposition and resultant peaceful political 
transition. Elections from 1952 until 1980 have been conducted in a 
legal and open manner with high voter turnout and popular participation 
in the electoral process. The institutionalization of Costa Rican 
politics has created a nation which is unique in modern Latin America. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a result of Costa Rica's natural ruggedness and geographic 
location, its development was very slow compared to its Central American 
neighbors. A lack of natives to serve as slaves meant that Costa Rican 
farms were limited in size, as the colonists were forced to work the 
land themselves. As the years passed the citizens of Costa Rica, 
isolated from the other areas or the region, became tough and 
independent small farmers. The fervor of revolution that swept the rest 
of Latin America barely affected the Costa Ricans. 
In the years following independence from Spain, the nation drifted 
on a political course which never managed to achieve permanence. Heroes 
and tyrants teok their places in Costa Rican history, with the net 
effect being a lack of direction. Despite the independent and democratic 
spirit of the nation's citizens, individuals who became the leaders of 
Costa Rica often placed their own interests above those of the country. 
Although contributions to national development came from a few 
patriotic and enlightened presidents during the twentieth century, the 
Costa Rica of the 1940's found itself on the brink of social conflict. 
When Calderdn Guardia attempted to return to power illegally, opponents 
began the 1948 Civil War. 
123 
124 
American intervention was critical in the conflict. Even before 
the rebels of Jose Figueres began their assault on government forces in 
the mountains southwest of San Jos{, the American embassy was aware of 
their plans. The names of pilots and rebel leaders were known to 
American officials, as was the military strategy of the conspirators. 
American Military Attache' Lt. Col. James R. Hughes provided strategic 
assistance to the revolutionaries when fighting broke out. After only 
one week of fighting, the conclusion of officials at the embassy was 
that without outside sources of supplies and aid, the government would 
be defeated. When this information reached the State Department, every 
effort of Picado' s government to obtain outside help was thwarted by 
American intervention. Military purchases, crucial to the survival of 
the Picado regime, were denied. Diplomatic intervention by Washington 
prevented Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza from complying with the 
Costa Rican government's request for aid. While the embassy in San Josl 
maintained a public posture of diplomatically correct neutrality, 
American policy was formulated to ensure the defeat of President Picado 
and the elimination of Communism from Costa Rica. 
The rebel victory in the Civil War by JosEf Figueres' Army of 
National Liberation resulted in the introduction of a new, intellectual 
generation of Costa Ricans to the task of governing the nation. 
Descendants of the liberal philosophy of the Centro embarked on a 
democratic course designed to elevate the standard of living of the 
nation's impoverished campesinos while involving them in political 
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participation. For the first time in Costa Rican history, a political 
party was created which placed philosophical considerations above 
personalities. 
The American intervention to combat the influence of Connnunism in 
Costa Rica had the effect of institutionalizing democracy in the small 
Central American nation. Regardless of the immediate designs of 
America's policy, the result proved itself with the passage of time. 
The actions of the United States of America in 1948 served the dual 
purpose of eliminating the small Partido Vanguardia Popular from its 
position of influence in Costa Rican politics while ensuring the 
permanent establishment of democracy. 
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